Saving the Hague Choice of Court Convention by Woodward, William J., Jr.
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2008
Saving the Hague Choice of Court Convention
William J. Woodward Jr.
Santa Clara University School of Law, wwoodward@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
29 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. 657
SAVING THE HAGUE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION
WILLIAM J. WOODWARD, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Developing an international regime that would require some
level of international recognition or enforcement of the judgments
of courts of other countries has been a goal for international
lawyers, particularly those in the United States, for many years.
Concluded in 2005, the Hague Choice of Court Convention ("the
Convention") may not be the gold ring, but it promises to make
substantial improvements in international judicial dispute
resolution and thereby add immensely to international economic
well-being. Through the Convention, states will agree to recognize
or enforce the judgments of other state parties when those
judgments follow valid "choice of court agreements" defined (and
also regulated) in the treaty. Since most international trade begins
with a contract, and since most of those contracts already contain
dispute resolution provisions, the Convention may have delivered
a great advance in this area. But it is obvious from the nature of
the Convention that its success depends critically on widespread
international acceptance; if only a few states join it, the
international system will not have become much better than it is
now.
Unfortunately, only Mexico has ratified the Convention in the
more than two years since the Convention was concluded and it
seems in danger of dying a slow death for lack of interest.
Leadership by the United States, a primary advocate for an
international accord, may be in order.
The problem is that the Convention, as drafted, will not find
uniform and reliable enforcement within the United States. In two
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particular kinds of contracts covered by the Convention, franchise
contracts and what I call "mass market contracts," some choice of
forum provisions are difficult or impossible to enforce in several
U.S. states under current law. Some of this law has developed very
quickly. The state of domestic law presents a compliance problem
for the United States in the first instance if it joins the Convention,
but that problem may be dwarfed by the very practical problem of
leading other countries to join the Convention thereby ensuring its
success. This will be very difficult if other states perceive the
United States, owing to these developments, and the diversity in its
state commercial law, making less of a commitment under the
Convention than other states will make if they join the Convention.
After examining the case law in the United States that will
cause the problems, this Article considers alternative solutions,
concluding that the Convention itself supplies the best approach,
one that the United States should embrace in its efforts to lead
other countries in improving the international dispute resolution
system.
1. INTRODUCTION
In our newly globalized world, an American litigator's
nightmare might run something like this. A foreign corporation
doing limited business in the United States breaches its contract
with the domestic client, causing serious damages. The lawyer
manages to serve process properly on the defendant in a reliable
local jurisdiction, and over the course of many months, prepares
and tries the case to a substantial victory that would make any
client proud. But, before the festivities end, the litigator (or the
client) realizes that the game is not over: there is still the matter of
collecting the judgment. In our nightmare, of course, the
defendant has very few assets in the United States. It is here, if she
is lucky, that the lawyer will wake up before she faces one of the
grim realities of globalization: there is no international system that
requires states to honor each others' judicial decisions. Collection
in a foreign jurisdiction will never be easy in the current
environment; in the worse case, the lawyer will have to go to the
jurisdiction with the assets and try the case all over again, this time
in all likelihood in a far less sympathetic forum. The nightmare
apparently is far more real for Americans seeking enforcement
[Vol. 29:3
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abroad than it is for those seeking the recognition or enforcement
of foreign judgments in American courts.'
Even if peculiarly American, this nightmare is, of course, a little
unrealistic. Few competent lawyers would begin substantial
litigation without considering the prospects for enforcing any
resulting judgment. By the same token, few sophisticated traders
will make an international contract without considering the
difficulties dispute resolution might present if the contract goes
bad. Thus, while it is an obstacle to efficient trade, the absence of
reliable international recognition and enforcement of judgments
works its way into the thinking of those who initiate litigation and
negotiate contracts, and they work around it. Probably the most
common solution at the contracting stage might be to include an
arbitration clause in the contract. Since at least the 1970s, states
have agreed to mutually enforce arbitral awards through their
joining the New York Convention.2 If our lawyer began an
arbitration proceeding instead of a lawsuit, she would have vastly
enhanced confidence that enforcement would not be blocked by
the lack of cooperation among states.
The absence of an international regime for enforcing judgments
makes for hard strategic decisions in deciding where to bring a
lawsuit. Many states recognize or enforce foreign judgments. But
they are not required to, and high levels of uncertainty here may be
endemic: international enforcement depends on many factors,
including the nature (and perhaps the size) of the resulting
judgment itself. This uncertainty of eventual enforcement surely
influences the decisions that plaintiffs' lawyers make at the outset
of litigation - they will be more likely to bring their litigation in the
1 See Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party
Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 544-50
(2005) (discussing how negotiations of the Convention focused on "exporting"
United States judgments, making them more enforceable abroad); Matthew H.
Adler & Michele Crimaldi Zarychta, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: The United States Joins the Judgment Enforcement Band, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1, 2 (2006) (explaining how the goal of the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements was to allow successful U.S. litigants to enforce U.S. judgments
against their opponents' foreign assets).
2 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards art. I, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention]. The United States ratified the treaty in 1970. 9 U.S.C. §
201 (2000). See also Adler & Zarychta, supra note 1, at 1, 3 (discussing the New
York Convention and subsequent international enforcement agreements).
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state with jurisdiction over the defendant's assets, even if witnesses
and evidence may be elsewhere.
This uncertainty about how - and whether - the outcome of
judicial dispute resolution will be recognized in other jurisdictions
raises risk and retards efficiency, 3 and (which is much the same
thing) an uncertain system of mutual recognition and enforcement
makes dispute resolution far more cumbersome. Defendants face a
very similar problem: if a defendant cannot get recognition of its
victory in other jurisdictions that might exercise jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's claims, the defendant faces the prospect of fighting
twice - or more - for the same victory.
It is thus easy to understand why, since the 1950s, there has
been substantial interest in developing international cooperation in
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. 4 Since the problem
is perceived to affect the United States more than other states, it is
also easy to see why the United States has taken a leadership role
in these efforts.
The latest attempt to establish an international system dates to
1992 in the Hague Conference on Private International Law ("the
Conference").5 Perhaps this ambitious effort was doomed to
failure. An implication of recognizing or enforcing the judgment
of another sovereign is that the enforcing or recognizing court
takes the other judgment as its own without questioning the
underlying process or rules. Both can be problematic: will a state
that believes in the adversarial system for finding the truth trust in
a more inquisitorial system? Will the rules developed for a
different regulatory climate - punitive damages or class actions, for
example -be accepted without question in a different legal culture
that prefers ex ante regulation? At a slightly different level, the
courts of each state are instruments of sovereignty; accepting
without question the judgments of other states is, to some extent, a
surrender of sovereignty. To defer to the judgments of another
3 One commentator put it into different terms: "The recognition and
enforcement of judgments rendered by the courts of other sovereigns is a central
tool of trade integration." Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of
Judgments: The Debate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 44, 44 (2001).
4 See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 271
(1994) (laying out the history of international efforts to enforce foreign
judgments).
5 Id. at 271.
[Vol. 29:3
CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION
state is to forego local judgment and the possibility of inserting
local values into a dispute resolution process. In a world where
legal cultures remain very diverse, creating a system where each
state defers to the judgment of the courts of other states is no small
task. It is no wonder the latest effort to create a multilateral system
for mutual recognition and enforcement failed to accomplish that
objective.
But the Hague Conference did not fail entirely. Instead, it
shifted its focus from mutual enforcement of judgments generally
to the mutual enforcement of that subset of judgments that follow
from "choice of court" 6 agreements. In so doing, the negotiators
changed the entire project from an effort to reconcile the many
differences in legal systems that produce judicial decisions, to one
of reaching consensus on the enforceability (and the implications of
enforceability) of a particular kind of contract term commonly
found in commercial contracts. By shifting the focus from the
deeply divisive questions of jurisdiction and sovereignty
implicated in mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, to
the more comfortable regime of contract enforcement, the
Conference managed to conclude a Convention on choice of court
agreements that may carry much of the potential for improvement
of international trade promised by the original project.
The scheme, obviously, does not cover all judgments-a
defendant in a tort action is not likely to agree to litigate with the
plaintiff in a particular court-but it probably covers most
judgments that will matter to international trade. After all,
international trade is largely based on initial contractual relations
among the traders and it is a simple matter, in any contract, to
include a provision specifying how disputes will be resolved.
Indeed, international traders probably include dispute resolution
provisions in most of their contracts already; given the
complexities that are implicated in resolving a business dispute at
the international level, including such provisions is simply good
business practice.
In many respects, changing the subject from judgments to
agreements was a brilliant move. By replacing the thorny and
6 In the United States, "choice of court" is an unusual term; provisions
choosing courts are typically referred to as "choice of forum" provisions and,
broadly interpreted, would include contractual provisions choosing arbitration. I
will use the Hague's "choice of court" term when referring to provisions choosing
judicial fora and the broader term "choice of forum" when referring to provisions
that select either a court or arbitral forum for dispute resolution.
20081
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intractable questions of the original project with the more
comfortable regime of contract, the negotiators managed to hide
many of the difficult issues under the umbrella of consent. If the
parties have agreed to an adversarial system, to a jurisdiction that
allows punitive damages, or to an adjudication system that has no
juries, the resulting judgment seems less controversial and seems
to raise fewer issues that might be of concern to the recognizing or
enforcing court.7 Of course, the court receiving the judgment is
still lending sovereign force to the judgment of the court of a
different sovereign, but the intervening agreement removes much
of the pressure of scrutiny from the receiving court. "If the parties
agreed to this, why should we intervene?"
In addition, while these agreements can result in enforceable
judgments, there is surely less international diversity in view about
enforcing contracts (even choice of court contracts) than there is
about enforcing judgments. Traders ranging from individuals
selling trinkets on a Beijing street to multinational corporations
selling other corporations in New York all work with a common
core of contract principles that is much the same around the world.
Thus, by making the shift from judgments to choice of court
agreements, the Conference changed the subject to one that carried
far more potential for international accord. Moreover, by moving
the discussion from the public realm of judgments to the
quintessentially private realm of contracts, the Conference might
also have successfully dodged hard public law questions that were
more evidently present when the focus of the discussions was
judgments.8
While the considerable effort of drafting the Convention is
7 Hard questions and conflicts of principle can be buried beneath choice of
forum agreements. For example, courts often closely scrutinize express
contractual provisions waiving a jury trial or a right to punitive damages. See,
e.g., Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Abbott, 863 S.W. 2d 139, 141 (Tex. App. 1993)
(stating that restrictions on right to a jury trial "will be subjected to the utmost
scrutiny"); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 293 (Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a provision waiving the rights to a jury trial and to punitive
damages in a contract of adhesion was unconscionable under California law). By
contrast, in the United States a customer's agreement to an arbitration provision
in an adhesion contract-a provision that, by definition, denies the customer the
right to a jury determination -seldom receives anywhere near that same level of
scrutiny.
8 See generally Perez, supra note 3 (developing a few "hard public law
questions" and recommendations for a process that would explicitly address
them).
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over, what remains is the work of persuading states to join the
Convention and, for the states that join, the work of implementing
the Convention's rules. This follow-through may have stalled.
The Convention's text was concluded in 2005 and it requires at
least two states to deposit instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession in order for it to enter into force.9 After two
years, only Mexico has joined the Convention and the Convention
has not yet entered into force.10 The situation seems to call for
strong leadership. As the leading proponent of the original
judgments project and this successor convention on choice of court
agreements, one would hope that the United States is taking a
leading role in this effort. Assuming that the United States still
supports the Convention, the effectiveness of its leadership may
well depend on how it approaches the Convention domestically
and, in particular, on how other states perceive the Convention
will operate in courts within the United States. In short, what the
United States does may be as-or more-important than what it
says.
This article addresses some of the issues that the United States
may have to confront in its follow-through efforts to make the
Convention a success. Section 2 gives a short introduction to the
Convention and its workings. Section 3 will argue that, despite the
best efforts of the negotiators, there remain under the Convention
areas where contract enforcement will inevitably be uncertain in all
states, but that the problems will be exacerbated within the United
States in part because of its federal system's legal diversity. Section
4 develops in more detail the subject areas where choice of court
agreements, covered by the Convention, will nonetheless
encounter uncertain enforcement in the United States. Section 5
then considers different options the United States might consider
in order to gain more certain domestic enforcement of Convention-
covered agreements. Finally, Section 6 looks at another option: for
the United States to join the treaty subject to specific qualifications
that would avoid anticipated domestic enforcement problems and
perhaps pave the way for other states to join the treaty.
9 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 31, done June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions
pdf&cid=98 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
10 Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Hague Convention Status Table,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2008).
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2. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 11
The Hague Convention, concluded in 2005, is a scaled-down
version of a far more ambitious project aimed at mutual
enforcement of judgments. 12  Briefly, the Convention makes
contractual "choice of court" 13  provisions in international
contracts14 enforceable both in the court designated by the
agreement, and in any unchosen court of a state party that might
obtain jurisdiction over a dispute covered by the choice of court
agreement. The court designated in the agreement (the "chosen
court") obtains jurisdiction over the dispute "unless the agreement
is null and void under the law of that State." i5 Correspondingly, a
"court not chosen" (the "seised court" in Convention terminology)
is, with limited exceptions,16 directed to give effect to the choice of
court agreement by dismissing or suspending its own
11 Hague Convention, supra note 9.
12 See id.; see also Adler & Zarychta, supra note 1, at 2-10 (discussing at length
the history and negotiations leading to the current Convention).
13 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14 "International contract" is broadly defined in Article 1. It provides in part:
For the purposes of Chapter II [Jurisdiction], a case is international
unless the parties are resident in the same Contracting State and the
relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute,
regardless of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with
that State.
For the purposes of Chapter III [Recognition and Enforcement], a case is
international where recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is
sought.
Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 2-3 (explanatory brackets added).
15 Id. art. 5, para. 1. The Convention also provides that a Contracting State
may enter a reservation to the effect that it may refuse to enforce a judgment
otherwise covered by the Convention "if the parties were resident in the
requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant
to the dispute, other than the location of the chosen court, were connected only
with the requested State." Id. art. 20. This would ordinarily cover a judgment
entered by a chosen court that took jurisdiction despite the lack of other elements
(i.e., parties, subject matter, performance, etc.) that would give the underlying
contract an international character.
16 Those exceptions include: a) the agreement is "null and void" under the
chosen court's law; b) one of the parties lacked capacity under the unchosen
court's law; c) giving effect to the agreement would be "manifestly contrary to the
public policy" of the unchosen court's State; d) "for exceptional reasons beyond
the control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed"; or e)
"the chosen court has decided not to hear the case." Hague Convention, supra
note 9, art. 6.
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proceedings. 17  More importantly, given the impetus for the
Convention, judgments obtained pursuant to choice of court
agreements covered by the Convention become enforceable in
contracting states, again with limited exceptions.' 8
Obtaining international consensus on enforcing agreements is
easier than on enforcing judgments, but there remain subject areas
where an international consensus on the desirability or
appropriateness of enforcing choice of court agreements is lacking.
The Convention attempts to reach common ground by excluding
many important subject areas from its reach. Thus, family matters,
antitrust, wills and succession, and personal injury, to name a few,
are excluded from the Convention.' 9 These are areas where there is
17 Id. art. 6.
18 Article 9 of the Hague Convention states that recognition or enforcement of
a judgment may be refused if:
a) the agreement was null and void under the law of the State of the
chosen court, unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement
is valid;
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of
the requested State;
c) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including the essential elements of the claim,
i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way
as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant entered
an appearance and presented his case without contesting notification in
the court of origin, provided that the law of the State of origin permitted
notification to be contested; or
ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner that is
incompatible with fundamental principles of the requested State
concerning service of documents;
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of
procedure;
e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the
public policy of the requested State, including situations where the
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State;
f) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested
State in a dispute between the same parties; or
g) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another
State between the same parties on the same cause of action, provided
that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its
recognition in the requested State.
Id. art. 9.
19 The full list in art. 2, para. 2 is:
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;
b) maintenance obligations;
2008]
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disagreement as to the appropriate norms or where the perceived
need for local control is strong. The Convention also preserves a
measure of local judicial autonomy for unanticipated situations by
explicitly authorizing a seised court both to decline to enforce a
choice of court agreement at the outset, or to recognize or enforce
the judgment resulting from it, for reasons of "public policy."20
The Convention also separately excludes altogether two
important categories of contracts: employment contracts, and
contracts "to which a natural person acting primarily for personal,
family or household purposes (a consumer) is a party."21
It is obvious, but worth emphasizing nonetheless, that the
courts involved-both chosen and not chosen-must be courts of
c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and
other rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar
relationships;
d) wills and succession;
e) insolvency, composition and analogous matters;
f) the carriage of passengers and goods;
g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general
average, and emergency towage and salvage;
h) anti-trust (competition) matters;
i) liability for nuclear damage;
j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons;
k) tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not arise
from a contractual relationship;
1) rights in rem in immovable property, and tenancies of immovable
property;
m) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of
decisions of their organs;
n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and
related rights;
o) infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and
related rights, except where infringement proceedings are brought for
breach of a contract between the parties relating to such rights, or could
have been brought for breach of that contract;
p) the validity of entries in public registers.
Id. art. 2, para. 2.
20 An unchosen court can decline to give effect to the agreement if it "would
lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of
the State of the court seised." Id. art. 6(c). A "requested court" may decline to
enforce a covered judgment if "recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations
where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
the fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State." Id. art. 9(e).
21 Id. art. 2, para. 1.
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"Contracting States." 22 By its very nature, the Convention imposes
absolutely no obligation on non-contracting states either to honor a
Convention-covered judgment or to enforce a Convention-covered
choice of court agreement. This, of course, means that the
Convention has no effect if only the United States ratifies it,23 and
that its intended effect depends critically on widespread
ratification.24 While needed attention has been given to domestic
legislation, either at the state or federal level, that may be necessary
in order for the United States to implement the Convention, 25 the
focus here will be on the earlier, and related, question: what
reservations, if any, should the United States include in its
ratification of the Convention? As will be seen, the conditions
under which the United States ratifies the Convention may have an
impact on how other states perceive its fairness when both they
and the United States are parties to it.26
This discussion is related to implementing legislation because,
given developments in domestic law related to choice of court
22 See id. art. 5, para. 1 (declaring that the court of a contracting state shall
have jurisdiction); id. art. 6 (declaring that a court of a contracting state which is
not the chosen court generally must dismiss or suspend proceedings when an
exclusive choice of court agreement applies).
23 See generally id. art. 31 (describing the various requirements and stages
through which the Convention must pass in order to gain force).
24 See generally id. art. 27, para. 4 ("Instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, depositary of the Convention.").
25 See, e.g., Curtis R. Reitz, Globalization, International Legal Developments, and
Uniform State Laws, 51 LoY. L. REV. 301, 301 (2005) ("The only feasible way to
create laws on a global scale is through the use of the ordinary legislative
machinery of nations, and this is the path of modern international legal
developments."); Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private International Law:
Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention in the United States 20-22 (Univ.
of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 06-27, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=921200 (examining
"the domestic process that should be used to implement, and the domestic law
that should be used to supplement, the Hague Convention," as well as the
interplay between federal and state law in filling the interstices of whichever
process is selected).
26 The obligations the United States assumes through a treaty can be limited
by reservations, understandings, and declarations. See generally Duncan B. Hollis,
Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2006) (discussing the alternative visions of the U.S. treaty power
(under the nationalist, new federalist, and "Executive Federalism" models),
examining the domestic implications of the executive's current practice for
federalism as a principle, and lastly analyzing the effect of the executive's
interpretation on U.S. foreign affairs.).
2008]
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agreements, general legislation to implement the obligations of the
treaty as drafted may not be feasible and, therefore, the situation
may call for narrowing the United States' obligations under the
treaty at the outset. To understand why, it is necessary to review
features of our commercial law system that will complicate our
implementation of the Convention.
While the impetus for the Convention is international
enforcement of judgments, the shift in focus to agreements draws us
into the complex nature of our federal judicial system for resolving
contract and commercial law disputes. It is this system that is at
the core of the problems we confront here. International
businesses who face our commercial law and related judicial
dispute resolution systems encounter a set of substantive and
procedural rules that is difficult even for domestic businesses to
navigate. Because most domestic commercial law, and the
regulation that accompanies it, is made at the state level, rather
than federal, contracting parties face a level of uncertainty about
the applicable rules that contracting parties do not face in unified
systems. On top of that, most commercial law disputes are
adjudicated at the state level and state courts may vary in the
procedural rules they may use in resolving such disputes.
It is true that much of our substantive commercial law has
become reasonably uniform owing largely to the efforts of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
its uniform laws projects, most significantly, the Uniform
Commercial Code. But there are important residual differences in
the substantive commercial law from one state to the next, and also
in the procedural rules that control the litigation process at the
state level. To make matters much worse, most litigants can
choose from a number of different jurisdictions where to file suit,
and there is no uniform conflict of laws rule applicable in all states.
This means that some outcomes can be controlled by ex post forum
shopping, something that cannot easily be controlled at the initial
contracting stage.
Because forum shopping can be reduced by enforceable choice
of court (or forum) agreements, strong rules mandating their
enforcement can assist in achieving commercial certainty. The
Hague Convention thus has the potential to improve the status quo
for international transactions with respect to forum shopping and,
of course, it carries the substantial bonus of promising
international enforcement of covered judgments. But choice of
court agreements, at a foundational level, are controlled by local
[Vol. 29:3
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contract and conflict of laws rules. And, as will be developed
below, in the United States, important differences at the state level
in the enforceability of choice of court agreements will remain
untouched by the Convention. The result will be a level of
uncertainty in enforcement under the Convention that will reduce
or limit its usefulness for international businesses doing business
in the United States. To the extent the United States can, through
implementing legislation or other means, ameliorate or reduce this
systemic uncertainty as it joins the Convention, it will, in the
process, make joining the Convention more attractive to others and
thereby improve the odds that the Convention will be a success. 27
The commercial importance of widespread ratification of the
Hague Convention has been underscored by recent empirical work
focused on fully-negotiated business contracts. Researchers have
uncovered the surprising finding that, given their choice, most
businesses that negotiate contracts would prefer a judicial dispute
resolution system over arbitration.28 Whether the results come
from differences in cost, the potential for error correction through a
sophisticated appellate process, or from other reasons, these
findings have particular relevance in the international business
arena where the widely-ratified New York Convention,29 requiring
international enforcement of arbitral awards, contrasts sharply
with the absence of any treaty-based requirement to enforce
international judgments. The New York Convention probably
provides strong incentives for arbitration in international
agreements.30 If, by contrast, businesses prefer judicial resolution
27 Other federal states such as Germany and Mexico may face analogous
problems in their joining the Convention and may also need to constrain their
obligations slightly at ratification. A discussion of the analogous problems of
other federal states is far beyond the scope of this Article. It is important,
however, to note that the United States is unique in its desire for such a
Convention and its corresponding need to lead other states in ratifying and
implementing the Treaty.
28 See e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration:
An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies'
Contracts (Berkeley Elec. Press Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1826, 2006),
available at http:/ / law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1826/ (attempting to explain
why many contracts entered into by publicly-held companies do not contain
binding arbitration clauses); cf. Teitz, supra note 1, at 548 (noting that many
contracts contain arbitration clauses because the enforcement of forum selection
clauses are often unpredictable).
29 New York Convention, supra note 2.
30 Cf. Teitz, supra note 1, at 546-48 (describing the New York Convention and
the Choice of Court Convention as analogues in that the former provided an
2008] 669
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for their disputes, this status quo artificially alters their preferences
and is inefficient. If these research findings hold for international
agreements, one could expect a treaty that facilitated international
judicial dispute resolution, even one as scaled back as the Hague
Convention, to contribute significantly to international economic
well-being.
3. RESIDUAL UNCERTAINTY UNDER THE CONVENTION
By attacking the problem of mutual enforcement of judgments
through a focus on choice of court agreements, the Convention
generates the important benefit of making the location and process
of judicial dispute resolution in international business settings
more predictable from the outset. Ideally, contracting parties
would agree to litigate in a particular legal system31 and find
enforcement of their agreement both where they agreed to litigate
(by the chosen court's assuming jurisdiction) and where they did
not (by the non-chosen court's dismissing or suspending
proceedings). Later, once a judicial resolution was reached, that
judgment would be recognized or enforced in other contracting
states. In these respects, the Hague Convention resembles the New
York Convention 32 which operates in a similar way with respect to
international arbitration agreements and awards entered by
arbitrators. In mandating enforcement of domestic arbitration
agreements, the far older Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)33 is
another set of rules whose object and structure are much the same.
All three sets of rules-the Hague Convention, the New York
Convention, and the Federal Arbitration Act-were drafted to
address the same kind of problem: judicial resistance to being
"ousted" of jurisdiction by a mere contract of the parties. 34 All
incentive for arbitration in international agreements while the latter will provide a
viable alternative to arbitration).
31 The Convention permits the parties to select "the courts of one Contracting
State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State ...... Hague
Convention, supra note 9, art. 3. Party agreement cannot, however, override local
jurisdictional rules such as subject matter or value in controversy. Id. art. 5, para.
3.
32 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. 3 ("Each Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the
rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon . .
33 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
34 In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the U.S. case that began
a domestic trend towards enforcement of choice of forum provisions, Chief Justice
Burger wrote:
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three validate executory contracts that select one dispute resolution
regime to the exclusion of others, all three specify narrow grounds
for avoiding the effects of the contractual dispute resolution
provision, and all three address the enforcement of the resulting
decision. Both the New York and the Hague Conventions have
exceptions that recognize an overriding strong public policy in the
enforcing court.35 The Federal Arbitration Act has no such public
policy exception but public policy enters through Section 2 which
provides that such provisions "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to
"oust" a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.
It appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt to
reduce the power and business of a particular court and has little place in
an era when all courts are overloaded and when businesses once
essentially local now operate in world markets. It reflects something of a
provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals. No one
seriously contends in this case that the forum-selection clause "ousted"
the District Court of jurisdiction over Zapata's action. The threshold
question is whether that court should have exercised its jurisdiction to do
more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties,
manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing
the forum clause.
Id. at 12. In older cases, the courts maintained that, because a court's jurisdiction
was set by law, the mere agreement of the parties was not strong enough to
displace it. See, e.g., Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 111 N.E.
678, 680 (Mass. 1916) ("Attempts to place limitations by contract of the parties
upon the powers of courts as to actions growing out of the particular contract, or
to oust appropriate courts of their jurisdiction, have been regarded with disfavor
and commonly have been held invalid."); Benson v. E. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 66
N.E. 627, 628 (N.Y. 1903) (holding that jurisdiction is determined by state
constitution and statute and "[i]t can neither be added to nor subtracted from by
the agreement of the parties"). All three regimes also address the enforceability of
the resulting awards or judgments. The Hague Convention is unique among the
three in that its genesis was the problem of international enforcement of
judgments rather than a refusal of courts to enforce choice of court agreements.
See Adler & Zarychta, supra note 1, at 2-10 (tracing the history of the Hague
Convention as an agreement designed to remedy the lack of uniformity in
international enforcement of arbitration judgments).
35 See Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 9 ("Recognition or enforcement
may be refused if... recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations
where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State."); New York
Convention, supra note 2, art. V, para. 2 ("Recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that... [t]he recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.").
20081
U. Pa. J. Int'l L.
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." 36
There can be no doubt that the FAA and the New York
Convention have improved the certainty of enforcement of
arbitration provisions, by simply countering the tendency of courts
to see their own jurisdiction over a controversy as sacrosanct
despite contractual wishes to the contrary. The Hague Convention
will, if widely ratified, bring the same improvement in certainty to
international choice of court agreements and provide that elusive
bonus of creating an initial framework for international recognition
and enforcement of judgments.37 But a good deal of residual
uncertainty remains despite the substantial improvements
achieved under all three sets of rules.
3.1. Uncertain "Public Policy"
Both the Hague Convention and the New York Convention
permit "public policy" of the seised court to override
enforcement38 and it should be obvious that no one can know for
sure what different courts will view as "public policy" in all given
contexts. Thus these explicit escape clauses invite courts in at least
some cases to refuse to recognize the specified choice of forum, or
the resolution reached in that forum. These uncertainty problems
are exacerbated in the United States because the "public policy" a
court might embrace could be a matter of either state or federal law
or both.39 Because state law can be implicated (and can differ) and
36 9 U.S.C. § 2.
37 There is no statutory analog to the FAA in the United States with respect to
choice of court agreements; the Convention will be the first set of uniform rules
governing such agreements in the United States. Historically, the recognition of
such agreements has been a matter of state or federal law, and, while they are
widely enforced in many contexts, there is state diversity. For examples of the
diversity relevant to the discussion here, see infra Section 3.2. At the enforcement
stage, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution eliminates the
problem of multijurisdictional recognition and enforcement of domestic
judgments.
38 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 9; New York Convention, supra note
2, art. V.
39 Cf. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 5(a)
(proposed 2005), in AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006) [hereinafter ALI
JUDGMENTS PROJECT]. "Public policy" could be brought at least partially under a
uniform federal domain. Cf. Burbank, supra note 25, at 23 (noting the Supreme
Court's warning that "both due process and state law might be unreliable sources
of 'fundamental principles of procedural fairness' for international purposes.").
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because no contract provision can entirely control the plaintiff and
the location of her lawsuit, one cannot be completely certain that a
given choice of forum provision will prevail over some asserted
"public policy" to the contrary. The uncertainty that differing local
policy brings was obviously recognized by the drafters and built
into the Hague Convention. Inasmuch as a main thrust of the
Convention is improved certainty, the exception is intended to be
narrowly construed.40
3.2. Uncertain Contract Enforcement
The Federal Arbitration Act has no public policy exception;
avoidance is limited to "such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract."41 Perhaps because this is the
only available escape hatch,42 there has been a great deal of
litigation in the United States about whether the parties actually
agreed to arbitration in the first place, or whether the purported
agreement to arbitration was unenforceable because it was
"unconscionable" (both general contract defenses). A growing
number of courts have been concluding, for one reason or another,
that contract provisions that select arbitration- particularly
arbitration that forecloses aggregate claim treatment (class
actions)- are invalid as a matter of local contract law.43
While it may not be readily apparent, the rulings in domestic
cases addressing FAA-covered arbitration clauses in contract law
terms will apply to arbitration provisions covered by the New
York Convention and to choice of court agreements covered by the
Hague Convention. Under both the New York Convention and the
40 Teitz, supra note 1, at 552-53.
41 Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 33, § 2.
42 A recent article implies that the contract law analysis used under § 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act by California courts is actually a smoke screen for the
courts' aversion to arbitration. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application
of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the
Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 39-41 (2006).
43 Recent cases include: Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006)
(discussing Massachusetts law); Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, 2006 WL 3827477
(W.D. Wash. 2006) (discussing Washington law); Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Aral v. Earthlink Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006); Muhammad v.
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach LLC, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006); Thibodeau v.
Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161
P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007); Coady v. Cross Country Bank, 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2007).
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Hague Convention, it is a contract -and the assent one infers from
a contract-that gives the arbitral panel its power, that makes the
Convention applicable,44 and that may give the chosen court its
jurisdiction. 45 Both the New York Convention and the Hague
Convention make repeated references to the "agreement" and, in
the case of the Hague Convention, the "chosen court." In a
contested case, neither will exist absent the finding that the parties
in fact made an "agreement" or "chose" a court.46 The threshold
contract law that will determine the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate or to litigate in a chosen court will likely be the forum's
own contract law.47 While most U.S. courts enforce choice of
forum clauses most of the time, some have regularly refused in
44 The Convention provides: "This Convention shall apply in international
cases to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial
matters." Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
45 Many chosen courts will probably have jurisdiction without reference to a
choice of court agreement. But an implication of the Convention is that a court
that would not otherwise have jurisdiction may obtain it through the choice of
court agreement. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 5. See also supra note 15.
46 It is unlikely that the Convention's drafters intended that reified words in a
document in the form of a "choice of court agreement" by themselves would
establish jurisdiction or commit both parties to some meaning attributed to those
words. Such an approach would add certainty, of course, but would undercut the
entire thrust of the Convention -real agreement as a predicate to enforcement of
judgments. The notion of agreement (consent to be bound, willingness to submit to
jurisdiction, and similar implications) is the magic that removes the thorny
questions behind the lack of consensus on judgments and what makes a widely
ratified Convention far more plausible than the original project. See supra Section
1. In any event, unless the Convention were absolutely clear that a formal, seal-
like approach to this set of questions were intended (it is not clear at all that the
drafters intended such a medieval approach), it is very unlikely that an American
court would, in a competently litigated case, embrace such a talismanic approach
to "agreement" and the Convention concepts related to it.
There seems to be nothing in the record of the negotiating history of the
Convention suggesting an awareness of the threshold contract law questions that
come directly from now-abundant case law addressing challenges to purported
arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act. This may be
understandable since much of the judicial action is very recent. See supra note 43.
47 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Limiting the Reach of
Adhesive Choice of Law and Forum Provisions, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 16-18 (2006)
[hereinafter Constraining Opt-Outs] (describing a three step analysis for
segregating the contract and conflict of law principles). Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971) (amended 1989) (providing in
pertinent part: "A choice-of-law provision.., will not be given effect if the
consent of one of the parties to its inclusion in the contract was obtained by
improper means .... Whether such consent was in fact obtained by improper
means or by mistake will be determined by the forum in accordance with its own
legal principles").
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some settings relevant here. Unless these outcomes are altered
through legislation or those subject areas excluded, there will be
less than full, uniform enforcement of covered agreements under
the Convention within the United States.
3.3. The Additional Problem of Multiple Available Fora
There is an additional, related problem that goes to commercial
certainty. In the United States, conflict of laws rules are matters of
local state law, "public policy" is, in any event, partly a matter of
state law, and for any given dispute covered by the Convention,
the plaintiff can likely find several state courts (other than the
"chosen court") that will have jurisdiction. This offers multiple
opportunities for differing views on the enforceability of a choice
of forum agreement. To bring this problem back to the contract
planning stage, since one can never predict with certainty at the
contract formation stage where a dissatisfied partner will choose to
file suit, one initially confronts some level of uncertainty with
respect to the enforceability of these dispute resolution provisions.
The general problem of "forum shopping" within a
"Contracting State" is very much exacerbated in countries with
multiple lawmaking jurisdictions, such as the United States.48 The
Hague Convention refers to these as "non-unified legal systems" 49
and the United States is probably the most important example of
such a system. Because "unified" legal systems have but one set of
rules to govern choice of forum agreements, forum shopping for
better rules simply cannot exist in the same way that it does in
non-unified systems.50
There are well-known solutions to the general problem of
48 As a former litigator, I recognize a softer version of forum shopping that is
available in any legal system, unified or not- shopping for the right kind of court,
shopping for the right judge, shopping for a forum that is inconvenient to one's
adversary. Perhaps because these forms of forum shopping are largely impossible
to regulate, forum shopping is usually recognized as a problem that might be
addressed by legal rule when the shopping will change one's actual legal
entitlements. For a wonderful treatment of the broader subject, see Frederich
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553 (1989).
49 See Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 25 (explaining that a contracting
state in which two or more systems of law apply in different territorial units with
respect to matters dealt with by the Convention is a "non-unified legal system").
50 As indicated above, supra note 48, forum shopping may well exist in any
jurisdiction where one could file suit in more than one court. But in unified legal
systems the rules are not diverse across different units and the procedure (at least
for a given level of original jurisdiction) will be the same.
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forum shopping within non-unified systems. Forum shopping for
more advantageous rules can obviously be reduced, if not
eliminated, by unifying the law of the different constituent
jurisdictions. In the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") can be seen, at one level, as an effort to unify the law and
thereby reduce the significance of legal advantage-seeking through
forum shopping. Federal legislation in the United States is an even
better approach. Ex ante predictability simply follows from
knowing what law a court will apply to one's transaction (or a
choice of forum provision within it); if (as with federal legislation
or truly uniform UCC provisions) the law is the same everywhere,
the prospects for prediction increase and some of the primary
reasons for forum shopping decrease.
Alternatively, one can substantially reduce legal uncertainty by
creating a uniform choice of law rule so that wherever suit is
brought the substantive law to be applied to the problem will be
the same. 51 Some have advocated this for the United States but
with little success so far.5 2
We have neither unified the law in the United States on
important issues that bear on the enforceability of choice of forum
clauses nor have we created a uniform choice of law rule that will
reliably point to the same law controlling them regardless of where
suit is filed. States continue to differ substantially on important
matters that may affect the enforceability of choice of forum
provisions53 and choice of law rules (which, if uniform, might all
point to a given jurisdiction's law governing a choice of forum
provision) are themselves matters of state law and can vary. This
means that the potential for forum shopping for law is present in
51 This is the approach of the Rome Convention, which created a uniform
choice of law rule for all member states. European Communities Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature June 19, 1980,
art. 7, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
52 Distinguished commentators have called for a federal choice of law rule.
See e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 250-56 (1992)
(listing three constitutional principles for choice of law determinations, plus the
corollary proposition that allows for federal enforcement of choice of law rules);
Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992)
(arguing that the inherently federal nature of choice of law questions in the U.S.
needs to be acknowledged and cultivated).
53 As testament to this point, the revisors of Article 1 of the Uniform
Commercial Code did not take the opportunity to create a uniform state law rule
to govern choice of forum provisions despite their obvious importance to
commercial transactions.
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the United States in a way that it does not exist in unified legal
systems. This offers the possibility that the enforceability of a
given choice of forum provision can depend on where suit is
brought. This complexity makes it particularly difficult for
businesses to rely on the enforceability of choice of forum
provisions in their contracts with people and entities in the United
States. What is important here is that this difficulty may extend to
those choice of forum provisions to which the Convention is
directed.
The simplest example (to be developed in more detail below)
involves franchises. In the United States, some states simply do
not permit the parties (or, more realistically, the drafter or
franchiser) to choose by contract the law or a forum different from
that of the location of the franchisee. As drafted, the Convention
does not exclude franchise agreements and, as drafted, will
unlikely yield enforcement of contract provisions choosing
(foreign) courts in those particular states if the franchisee is located
there. The Convention's public policy exceptions are certainly
broad enough for a domestic court to use in refusing to honor a
choice of court agreement in such a case at the outset or to
recognize or enforce a resulting judgment at the end. This means
that unless the United States takes corrective steps at ratification or
implementation, it is very unlikely that choice of court agreements
in covered franchise contracts will be enforced uniformly
throughout the United States. Put differently, the Convention's
goal of widespread, near-uniform enforcement of covered
agreements in a given contracting state will not be met in the
United States under the Convention as drafted.54
Two important areas, covered by the Convention as drafted,
will present substantial enforcement problems in the United States:
franchise agreements, as suggested above, and what I will describe
below as "mass market agreements." 55
54 To be sure, in the United States, this particular problem is a narrow one.
But it is not an insignificant one. Given common legal ancestry and history in the
United States and the categories of contracts excluded from the Hague
Convention, the state law governing choice of forum provisions that will operate
within the Convention is remarkably uniform and tends strongly toward
enforceability.
55 The two areas identified below are those in which our courts have actively
scrutinized choice of forum provisions and have divided in their approaches.
While there may be other Convention-covered subject areas where there could be
disagreement among the courts, none is evident from the modern cases.
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4. SUBJECT AREAS COVERED BY THE HAGUE CONVENTION WHERE
U.S. LAW VARIES
The need for widespread ratification of the Hague Convention
has, no doubt, played a very substantial role in the list of excluded
contract areas5 6 that, in turn, contributes to the Convention's
narrowed scope of coverage. Rules and attitudes governing
employment and the protection of workers, for example, vary
widely from state to state and we can expect the rules governing
choice of court agreements in the employment area to vary widely
as well. Some potentially-contracting states wish to protect their
employees from choice of court agreements in employment matters
or may not trust the courts of other states to adjudicate claims
involving their employees fairly or competently. Were the
Convention to include such contracts and thereby require
enforcement of choice of court agreements within them, states
might refuse to ratify the Convention on that account or might
ratify the Convention with reservations.5 7 Exclude employment
contracts (or other contracts or matters on which there are
predictably diverse policy views) and the prospects for ratification
increase. 58 Time will tell whether the balance between reducing
Convention coverage and attracting states to join the Convention
was set correctly.
But eliminating contract areas that vary from one potentially-
contracting state to another from the coverage of the Hague
Convention may solve only part of the ratification problem. If
there are diverse enforcement views within a contracting state the
Convention will not operate uniformly in such a state without
some action either at the ratification or implementation stages. 59
56 The long list of excluded subject areas is quoted supra note 19.
57 See supra note 20 (stating that it seems unlikely that the "manifest public
policy" exceptions are designed to address entire categories of contracts that a
ratifying State is unwilling to enforce). But see Teitz, supra note 1, at 552-53
(explaining that states may choose to remove an entire area of contracts, such as
those pertaining to asbestos, for example, from the scope of the Convention).
58 This is not unlike the dynamics that underlie the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The drafters of those provisions tend not to include provisions
on which there are differing views lest broad "enactability" be imperiled. See
William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common
Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511 (1997)
(describing the debate over secured-debt primacy in the UCC).
59 As noted above, the state of the law in other federal states is beyond the
scope of the discussion here. See text accompanying supra note 27. Because the
United States has assumed a leadership role in the effort to create a system of
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To make this more concrete, if it is harder for a drafter to rely
on an international choice of court agreement involving a U.S.
party than it is to rely on one involving a non-U.S. party, the treaty
will be perceived as lopsided in the benefits it delivers. Those
trading with U.S. parties have a burden of lower-predictability not
shared by U.S. parties dealing with other systems. In the United
States, at least, the public policy exceptions in the Convention and
local contract law operating through the Convention will ensure
diverse outcomes in the enforcement of some covered agreements,
a result likely at odds with the thrust of the Convention. If the
treaty is perceived as lopsided in favor of the United States or its
businesses, it will be yet more difficult to get broad ratification.
Fixing the problem requires first that we identify more specifically
those areas covered by the Hague Convention where U.S. state law
is divergent.
In the United States, much of the developing law comes to us in
situations where the contract provision designates arbitration
panels or processes rather than courts. These cases arise in the
United States under the Federal Arbitration Act and form, at
present, the vast bulk of the modern cases where the parties litigate
a contractual choice of forum provision. Indeed, these cases seem
to represent a disproportionate amount of contemporary U.S.
litigation in the contract and consumer law areas.60 While the FAA
cases are, for reasons suggested above, 61 analyzed under local
contract law principles, their volume may be a sign that the law
(either of arbitration, forum selection, or both) is in flux, or that
there is a wide diversity in views within the United States as to
appropriate policy. Whichever is the case, the existence of
substantial litigation suggests that there is enough uncertainty in
predicting outcomes to make the cases worth litigating. What
follows is a preliminary treatment62 of the two particular areas of
contract law, currently covered by the Hague Convention, that
mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, its actions will serve as
examples to other federal States and, I contend, contribute to the ultimate success
or failure of the Convention.
60 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (2002) (discussing the trend towards
mandatory arbitration in contract law).
61 See supra text beginning at note 42.
62 See supra text accompanying note 55. If other areas of divergence are
identified, the approach advocated in this Article can be applied to those as well.
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stand out as having vast diversity in state law across the United
States.
4.1. Franchise Cases
Franchise contracts are not excluded from the Convention's
coverage. Yet in the United States, there are diverse strongly-held
views about the appropriate treatment of franchisees. Local
statutes sometimes make choice of forum provisions unenforceable
and some courts have taken a strong hand in implementing
statutory schemes. This spells trouble for uniform enforcement,
within the United States, of choice of forum provisions in
international franchise contracts covered by the Convention.
In November 2006, the en banc 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.,63 a case that brings together in
one place California's law of contracts and that state's underlying
public policy of strong franchisee protection. In Nagrampa, the
franchisee had her franchise business in California. The
relationship eventually deteriorated and in 2001 the franchiser,
pursuant to an arbitration provision in the contract, began
arbitration proceedings to recover allegedly unpaid fees.
Negotiations failed to settle the location of the arbitration and the
franchiser eventually went forward, under the contract provision,
with the arbitration proceeding in Boston. The franchisee refused
to participate and, eventually, an arbitration award of over
$160,000 was entered against her. 64 Meanwhile, in 2002, the
franchisee brought her own suit for fraud and for violations of the
California's Legal Remedies Act and California's laws governing
franchises and unfair competition 65 in a California state court.66
The case was eventually removed to a federal district court which
dismissed her case on the basis of the arbitration provision in the
contract. That decision was affirmed by a panel of the 9th Circuit
and a rehearing en banc granted.67
Because the Federal Arbitration Act limits defenses to an
arbitration provision to "such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract," 68 the argument, of necessity,
63 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006).
64 Id. at 1295 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1295-96.
66 Id. at 1295.
67 Id. at 1267 (majority).
68 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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centered on whether the arbitration provision was binding as a
matter of ordinary California contract law. 69 While a major focus
of both majority and dissenting opinions was the important (and
likely decisive) question whether enforceability should be
determined by the (Boston) arbitrator or the (California) court,70
the majority concluded that the plaintiff's unconscionability
challenge was valid and thereby rejected the arbitration provision
(and by implication, the Boston arbitration award).71
The Federal Arbitration Act complicates an analysis that
refuses enforcement of a choice of forum provision that selects
arbitration. Where the choice of forum term is a choice of court,
rather than an arbitration provision covered by the Federal
Arbitration Act, many state courts in the United States have little
trouble refusing to enforce it in the franchise context. Kubis &
Perszyk Associates v. Sun Microsystems Inc.,72 was a case brought by
a New Jersey franchisee against a California franchiser. It
implicated the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act,73 a state
69 The analysis proceeded under California law despite the fact there was an
obvious connection as well with Massachusetts and that, indeed, the contract
specified the application of Massachusetts law. See supra note 63, at 1267
(explaining the court's decision to proceed under California law in contravention
of a Massachusetts law provision because the conduct of the parties implicitly
waived said provision). Had the franchiser pressed the choice of law clause, it
seems likely that the California court would have rejected it in any event. See
Coady v. Cross Country Bank, 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (summarizing
the choice of law issues); c.f. Woodward, supra note 47, at 8-10 (discussing the
values which motivate the degree to which choice of law clauses are enforced); see
also Firchow v. Citibank, No. B187081, 2007 WL 64763 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2007)
(rejecting both the contract's choice of South Dakota law and the contention that
the arbitrator is the person to decide such issues).
70 Nagrampa, 469 F.3d. at 1268-80 (majority), 1297-1301 (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting). In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), the
contract at issue containing the arbitration provision had been challenged as
illegal (and therefore unenforceable in its entirety) under Florida's criminal usury
statutes and was so found by the Florida courts including the Florida Supreme
Court. Id. at 442. But the Florida courts had no business deciding the issue
because, said the U.S. Supreme Court, the challenge was not to the arbitration
provision specifically but to the contract as a whole. The question of illegality was
for the arbitrator. Id. at 445. Firchow is a recent, unreported case that shows a
plaintiff avoiding Buckeye's tilt toward arbitrator decision making by articulating a
different theory for challenging the arbitration provision. Firchow, 2007 WL 64763.
71 While the four dissenting judges wrote in three separate dissents, they
agreed that, for one reason or another, the arbitration provision was not
unconscionable under California law.
72 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996).
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1-15.
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statutory scheme designed to protect New Jersey franchisees. The
franchise contract declared that litigation was to be conducted in
California under California law and, when suit was brought in
New Jersey, the franchiser maintained that the New Jersey act was
inapplicable and that litigation should proceed in California.
Concluding that New Jersey law applied to the controversy, 74 the
court had this to say about choice of forum provisions in franchise
contracts:
[W]e hold that forum-selection clauses in franchise
agreements are presumptively invalid, and should not be
enforced unless the franchisor can satisfy the burden of
proving that such a clause was not imposed on the
franchisee unfairly on the basis of its superior bargaining
position. Evidence that the forum-selection clause was
included as part of the standard franchise agreement,
without more, is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of invalidity.75
At least thirteen states hold, one way or the other, that choice of
forum provisions will be unenforceable in franchise agreements.76
Some courts hold the contrary. 77 This diversity of views on the
subject creates uncertainty of enforcement, depending on the U.S.
jurisdiction where the litigation takes place. As matters now stand,
whether excepted as a matter of local contract law (Nagrampa) or as
a matter that easily fits within the "manifest public policy"
exception in the Hague Convention, choice of court agreements
under a U.S.-ratified Convention will have difficulty finding
reliable, uniform enforcement in the United States when one party
is a U.S. franchisee. 78
74 In so doing, the court invalidated the choice of law provision in the
contract. For a discussion of this closely-related aspect of the case, see
Woodward, supra note 47, at 38.
75 Kubis, 680 A.2d at 627.
76 See James Zimmerman, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise
Agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV.
759, 773 (1998) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act should not pre-empt state
franchise laws).
77 E.g., Horner v. Tilton, 650 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that
"forum-selection provisions are not per se invalid").
78 A franchiser can, of course, predict whether its choice of forum provision
will be enforced for a given franchise; the question simply depends on where the
franchisee is located. But, by covering franchises, the Convention seems to
contemplate that all international choice of forum provisions will be enforceable,
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4.2. Mass-market Cases
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
excludes from its reach "consumer contracts," narrowly defined as
those "to which a natural person acting primarily for personal,
family or household purposes (a consumer) is a party." 79 The
distinction between "consumer" and "non-consumer" contracts
thus essentially depends on the use to which the customer intends
to put the product or service. While this is the construct used in
the Uniform Commercial Code,80 it is a narrow definition relative
to similar constructs here and abroad. European law defines
"consumer" by exclusion, as someone not acting in her professional
capacity.81 Under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
"consumer" means "any natural person obligated or allegedly
obligated to pay any debt."8 2  The Federal Electronic Funds
Transfer Act defines "consumer" merely as a "natural person."83
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act defines "consumer" as:
[A]n individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a
subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the
term does not include a business consumer that has assets
of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a
corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or
more .... 84
Other states may define its "consumer protection" in various
contexts with similar breadth.85
One can anticipate problems enforcing choice of court
agreements under the Convention (both at the jurisdictional and
the recognition/enforcement stages) in those cases that are
protected under broader "consumer" definitions or under other,
regardless of the franchisee's location. Under the current state of U.S. law, that is
unlikely to be the case.
79 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 1(a).
80 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(11) (2003 Revision) (defining a consumer).
81 Rome Convention, supra note 51, art. 5, para. 2.
82 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (2000).
83 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(5) (2000).
84 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 2002).
85 For example, California's Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1785.3(b) (West 2000) provides that "consumer" means a natural
individual.
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comparably-broad, constructs in U.S. state law, yet not excluded as
"consumer contracts" from coverage in the Convention. In some of
those cases, at least, one can anticipate the domestic court refusing
to recognize the choice of court agreement either under local
contract law (a prerequisite to "agreement" in the Convention)86 or
on public policy grounds (an explicit Convention exception).87 A
first step to addressing this potential problem is identifying those
more specific situations covered by the Convention where the
choice of court agreement might encounter difficulty.
In what could be regarded as an avalanche in the normally
glacial process of common law change, the courts in at least eight
jurisdictions in the last two years have rejected or limited,88
generally on contract law grounds, arbitration provisions that had
the effect of depriving the buyer of a mass-distributed product or
service the right to class action relief.89 Owing, no doubt, to the
long shadow cast by the Supreme Court's expansive
interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act,90 these cases are
generally analyzed as contract law cases, with the courts
concluding that an arbitration provision that denies class action
relief is, as a contract matter, unenforceable. As in the franchise
area, there is a diversity of viewpoints: there are also modem cases
that hold a class action waiver to be no impediment to the
enforcement of a choice of forum provision.91
86 See supra text accompanying note 41.
87 See supra text accompanying note 38.
88 In some of the cases, the court severed the class action waiver, effectively
giving the bank the choice of class arbitration or no arbitration. Banks apparently
opt for the latter.
89 For examples of arbitration cases which have precluded class action, see
generally Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d
229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (111.
2006); Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A.2d 88
(N.J. 2006); Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C06-1325Z, 2006 WL 3827477
(W.D.Wash. Dec. 27, 2006); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2006); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007); Coady v. Cross
County Bank, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
90 An excellent treatment of this area is Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331 (1996) (discussing five
commercial arbitration cases from the 1994 and 1995 Terms of the Supreme
Court).
91 See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Georgia, LLC, 400 F.3d 868
(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that waiver of class action right did not render
arbitration agreement unenforceable); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp. -
Alabama, 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a borrower could
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While it may not be readily apparent, these are not necessarily
"consumer cases," as they are defined in the Hague Convention,
because the underpinning of the cases has little or nothing to do
with the use to which the customer will put the product or service.
A defendant engaging in "swapping agreements" in violation of
the antitrust laws, 92 charging customers for services before the
services begin,93 or imposing an illegal service termination fee 94 has
precious little to do with the character of the use the customer
makes of the product.95 Two issues, unrelated to intended product
use but related to one another, generate these cases. The more
obvious one is the "small claim problem," that is, the injustice that
results if the plaintiff, owing to the expenses and burdens of
individual litigation, cannot afford to litigate her valid, but tiny,
individual claim. The other issue is less connected to awarding a
plaintiff relief than to policing defendant's business practices.
Without the class action mechanism, a mass-market business has a
tremendous incentive to bill customers for small amounts that,
over thousands or millions of transactions, add up to very
substantial financial gain. The trial court, as quoted by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Thibodeau v. Comcast,96 expresses
both rationales that appear in these cases:
contract away right to class action relief); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing,
290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding arbitration agreement to be enforceable
in purported class action); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d
Cir. 2000) (holding that neither Truth in Lending Act (TILA) nor Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (EFTA) provides a bar to arbitration).
92 See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30 (concerning antitrust violations whereby
defendant corporations were accused of trading customers with competitors via
"swapping agreements.").
93 See Aral, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 231 (involving an internet service provider that
allegedly charged customers for service before they received equipment to utilize
the service).
94 See Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 276 (regarding an action against a cellular
telephone service provider, alleging that early-termination fee constituted an
illegal penalty and that imposition of the fee was both a breach of the service
agreement and statutory fraud under state Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act).
95 In Muhammad, the Court was focused on "payday lending" and the
violation of the local racketeering and consumer fraud laws. While unlikely, the
plaintiff could have used the borrowed money for a business venture. What the
money was used for (personal or household use or business use) had nothing to
do with the holding in the case. Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth, 912
A.2d 88, 103 (N.J. 2006).
96 Thibodeau v. Comcast, 912 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
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Mr. Thibodeau and [his] class members are claiming
minimal damages .... Mr. Thibodeau and each of his class
members allege they were unlawfully overcharged $9.60
per month. Everyone knows that these claims will never be
arbitrated on an individual basis, either by the named
plaintiffs or by any other of the millions of class members
they represent. No individual will expend the time, fees,
costs and or other expenses necessary for individual
litigation or individual arbitration for this small potential
recovery. If the mandatory individual arbitration and
preclusion of class action provisions are valid, Comcast [is]
immunized from the challenges brought by Mr. Thibodeau,
brought by any class member, or effectively from any
minor consumer claims. It is clearly contrary to public
policy to immunize large corporations from liability by
allowing them to preclude all class action litigation or
arbitration.97
In Szetela v. Discover Bank,98 a much earlier case that can be
viewed as a shot that triggered the avalanche, the court responded
to the familiar 99 yet counterintuitive argument that a class action
waiver could actually be of benefit to customers:
While the advantages to Discover are obvious, such a
practice contradicts the California Legislature's stated
policy of discouraging unfair and unlawful business
practices, and of creating a mechanism for a representative
to seek relief on behalf of the general public as a private
attorney general. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et
seq.) It provides the customer with no benefit whatsoever;
to the contrary, it seriously jeopardizes customers'
consumer rights by prohibiting any effective means of
litigating Discover's business practices. This is not only
substantively unconscionable, it violates public policy by
97 Id. at 885-86.
98 Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
99 See, e.g., Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?: Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car
Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 137,
147 (2006) (critiquing the counterintuitive rhetorical flourishes that have sustained
one-sided contracts with consumers).
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granting Discover a "get out of jail free" card while
compromising important consumer rights.100
Thus, in some cases, class action waivers can deprive customers
of all remedy simply owing to the realities of litigation, even
through arbitration proceedings are touted as less expensive than
court litigation. Second, requiring the customers to litigate
individually, knowing that most will not, means that the vendor
might be unfairly advantaged -$9.60 per month across millions of
customers 01 builds up to real money fairly quickly. It is the lack of
remedy on the vendee side and the aggregation of unearned
benefit on the vendor side that drives these cases.102 The cases
have to do with the mass distribution of goods and services to
ultimate customers, not the use to which the customers intend to
put the products or services they are buying.
Of course, not all jurisdictions see things this way. The older
cases have enforced class action waivers within arbitration
clauses. 103 They have typically asked whether the class action
waiver made relief unavailable to the plaintiff and, if it did not,
they have upheld the waiver. The policy of deterring unlawful
business practices through the class action mechanism is not a
factor in these cases. In Gipson v. Cross Country Bank'0 4, for
example, the court held that, because the Fair Credit Billing Act' 05
provided for the plaintiff to recover attorney fees in a successful
100 Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.
101 Thibodeau, 912 A.2d. at 886.
102 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 166-67 (2006) (discussing how democratization of markets
gives rise to the misbehavior of sellers that are not worth the "transactional
headaches for the consumer to challenge.").
103 See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir.
2005); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir.
2001); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002);
Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Alan S.
Kaplinsky, A Scorecard on Where Federal and State Appellate Courts and Statutes Stand
on Enforcing Class Action Waivers in Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Agreements, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE (PRACTISE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 11165, 2007) 9
(highlighting the many cases, reported, unreported, published, and unpublished
that enforce class action waivers); Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions:
A Contradiction in Terms, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE (PRACTISE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES No. 11165, 2007) 427 (outlining section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the split in court on whether an arbitrator may certify a class
in arbitration).
104 294 F.Supp. 2d 1251, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
105 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2000).
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action, the plaintiff was not precluded by the small size of her
claim from recovering. The area remains extremely contentious
and one can expect mass-market businesses to respond to these
new developments both through their contract forms and through
their lobbyists. A particularly glaring example comes from Utah,
where the legislature has enacted a statute that declares class action
waivers enforceable in consumer loan agreements. 106
Alternatively, a vendor might choose a forum that lacks a class
action device, thereby hiding the class action waiver in a "choice of
forum" provision. It works, at least sometimes.107 For example, a
Florida court sent the Florida plaintiff off packing to Virginia by
enforcing a choice of forum provision, despite the argument that
the provision was unconscionable because Virginia lacked a class
action device. 08
It is easy to imagine a choice of court agreement, covered by
the Hague Convention, being denied enforcement at the initial
stage or at the recognition and enforcement stages because the
effect of enforcement would be to deny the customer a class action
remedy in the designated court.10 9 A case nearly directly on point
is Dix v. ICT Group.11o In Dix, the plaintiff brought a class action
suit under Washington's Consumer Protection Act"' alleging that
America Online illegally charged customers for secondary
membership accounts. They were met with AOL's forum selection
106 UTAH. CODE ANN. § 70C-3-104 (2006).
107 See, e.g., Dix v. ICT Group, 161 P.3d 1016 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (rejecting
such a choice of forum provision as unconscionable).
108 America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
But see Dix, 161 P.3d at 1024 (holding that a forum selection clause specifying
Virginia was unenforceable because the lack of a class mechanism left the plaintiff
with "no avenue for relief").
109 Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental
Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 218 (1992) ("The class
action is a unique American legal institution. The procedure is not found in Italy,
Spain, France, Germany, South America, other civil law countries or, to our
knowledge, anywhere else in the world."). Other States may lack the robust class
action remedies of the United States in part because they take a more aggressive
approach to ex ante business regulation. But if that foreign regulation does not
extend to a foreign business's dealings with U.S. customers (which it might well
not), the rationale of the recent cases would apply to a choice of court agreement
designating a Contracting State's court that lacked the class action procedure,
regardless of the effectiveness of its ex ante regulation for its own residents.
110 Dix, 161 P. 3d at 1024.
111 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86 (2007). The Act does not limit remedies to
"consumers" as defined in the Hague Convention.
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clause that selected Virginia, a state with no class action device, as
the forum for litigation. In concluding that the forum selection
provision is unenforceable, the court said:
We affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that the forum
selection clause in the AOL contract at issue is
unenforceable on public policy grounds if the lack of a class
action procedure leaves the plaintiff with no feasible
avenue for seeking relief for violations of the CPA.112
Part of the problem is that the law in the United States is
diverse, and, in this setting, it makes predicting outcomes very
difficult. Moreover, the Convention seems to contemplate across-
the-board enforcement however, such uniform enforcement
throughout the United States, is unlikely, given the case law.
Unlike the franchise decisions, these cases are not neatly gathered
under an identifiable, preexisting legal category. It seems clear,
however, that the Hague Convention's narrow "consumer"
exclusion will not exclude many of these cases and, therefore, a
U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention as it was drafted will not,
without more, represent its commitment to reliably enforce choice
of court agreements in these kinds of cases.113
A prerequisite to any effort to address the problem that these
class action waiver cases represent is adequately defining them.
The first legislative attempt to do so came within the much-
maligned Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
112 Dix, 161 P. 3d at 1024.
113 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (codifying the fundamental principle of pacta
sunt servanda, "[e]very treaty in force is binding on the parties and must be
performed by them in good faith.").
One could, of course, gather both the franchise cases and the mass-market
cases under the omnibus "manifest public policy" exception and argue that this
exception accommodates the diversity in U.S. state law. I will leave to another
time the interesting legal question whether joining the treaty without addressing
the predictable refusal of a not-insignificant number of U.S. state courts to enforce
choice of court agreements in several categories violates either the spirit or letter
of the Vienna Convention. Perhaps the "manifest public policy" loophole is wide
enough to slide these divergent U.S. jurisdictions through.
Alternatively, the United States could use one or more unilateral reservations,
understandings, or declarations to clarify a more limited U.S. commitment to the
Treaty. Hollis, supra note 26. As will be developed below, the Convention
contains its own provision for limiting a State's commitment and is far superior to
the approach traditionally used to limit treaty commitments at ratification.
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(UCITA). The UCITA advanced a characteristically unwieldy
definition of this to-be-protected class of transactions.11 4  The
maturation of this classification may be found in the American
Law Institute's recently-concluded Project, Intellectual Property:
Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice-of-Law, and Judgments in
Transnational Disputes. That Project eloquently defines "mass-
market contract" as one "that (a) is prepared by one party for
repeated use; (b) is presented to another party or parties (the
"nondrafting party") by the party on behalf of whom the draft has
been prepared; (c) does not afford the nondrafting party a
meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms." 115 The contracts
where class action waivers have been rejected are all "mass-market
contracts," as the ALl Project would define the term. Class actions
clearly have no real role to play in the enforcement of either
negotiated or custom-made contracts. They probably have little
role to play when the contract is large, whether it is adhesive or
not, since the size of the transaction will generally support the
114 See THE UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 102(A)(44), 7 U.L.A.
195 (2002) [hereinafter UCITA]. This section states:
(44) "Mass-market transaction" means a transaction that is:
(A) a consumer contract; or
(B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if:
(i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed to
the general public as a whole, including consumers, under substantially
the same terms for the same information;
(ii) the licensee acquires the information or informational rights in a
retail transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an
ordinary transaction in a retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not:
(I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or public
display of a copyrighted work;
(II) a transaction in which the information is customized or otherwise
specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee, other than minor
customization using a capability of the information intended for that
purpose;
(III) a site license; or
(IV) an access contract.
Id.
115 INTELLECTUAL PROP.: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, § 101(3) (Proposed Final Draft 2007).
See also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, § 1010) (Discussion Draft
2007) (defining "Standard-Form Transfer of Generally Available Software" as "a
transfer of (1) small quantities of software to an end user; or (2) the right to access
software to a number of end users; if the software is generally available to the
public under substantially the same standard terms.").
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litigation necessary to remedy its breach, and a plaintiff with such
a claim is likely to proceed individually. 116 But importantly, the
contracts underlying these recent cases may or may not be
"consumer contracts" of the kind the Hague Convention would
exclude from its coverage." 7  Indeed, the Hague's consumer
exclusion in this respect is both under and overbroad.1n 8 This will
make for less-than-uniform enforcement of choice of forum
provisions covered by the Convention in a "mass market" contract
in the United States.
5. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO LEGAL DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED
STATES
It is reasonably clear that choice of court provisions in most of
the transactions covered by the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements will be enforced without difficulty in all courts
in the United States. This is probably true with or without the
Convention. Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Bremen," 9
choice-of-forum provisions have been widely enforced in the
United States, most particularly, in business contracts. Even in
non-business contexts, the Supreme Court's extension of Bremen in
Shute,12° an admiralty case involving an adhesive consumer
contract, has resulted in broad enforcement of choice of forum
provisions.' 2 ' Additionally, while commercial law in the United
States remains the province of state legislatures and courts and is
therefore open to diversity, the fact is that the commercial and
business law across the United States is remarkably uniform in
nearly all respects. Our common heritage, together with the
uniform laws process, has delivered us contract and commercial
116 Among other things, a claimant proceeding individually (rather than as a
class representative in a class action) will retain far more control over the
litigation and will probably retain more proceeds of any settlement or judgment.
117 See Dix v. ICT Group, 161 P.3d 1016 (Wash. 2006) (en banc).
118 A billionaire purchasing a yacht for "personal use" through a contract
drafted and negotiated by her own lawyer would be engaged in a "consumer
contract" as that term is defined in the Hague Convention. It would be difficult to
articulate a rationale for extending protection to such a "consumer" in this kind of
transaction.
119 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
120 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95(1991).
121 See generally Carrington, supra note 90, at 356 ("the savings resulting from
the enforcement of the clause went straight to the bottom line of Carnival Lines.
In offering its unrealistic analysis of economic effects, the Court did on this one
occasion pay its respects to neo-Spencerian law-and-economics.").
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law that differs only at the margins and is largely uniform both in
articulation and implementation in most business areas.122
But, as developed above, there are important areas now
covered by the Convention where the law in the United States is
diverse, and predictably so. In the mass-market area, the
developments have taken place so quickly that they likely occurred
after the Convention's "consumer" definition jelled; the domestic
"trend," if there is one, is such that we might anticipate more of the
same from other courts in the coming years. These cases are
decided under state contract law that, at least with respect to the
contract law issues,123 has been left untouched by the Convention.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court can easily step in to unify the
area, at least without some form of federal legislation. Such
unification, if it were possible, would certainly be a long time
coming. 12 4
Thus we face two related problems in leading other states to
join the Convention. The first is the problem of formal compliance.
What reservations, understandings, or declarations and/or
implementing legislation are needed as the United States joins the
Convention? The second is the practical problem of joining the
Convention in a way that is not perceived to give the United States
less of a commitment to choice of court enforcement than will be
the case elsewhere.
We will consider below the alternatives of strong implementing
122 But see F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity
and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2519 (1990) (showing the hundreds of "non-uniform amendments" to the
UCC ensure that the text is not completely uniform from state to state). Judicial
interpretations of given UCC provisions can differ by state as well. But the bulk
of the texts are uniform and courts are attentive to the importance of uniformity in
their interpretations. The longevity of the UCC and the absence of strong calls for
something even more uniform testifies to its workability in most modem business
settings.
123 As developed earlier, the Convention did not address the threshold
contract law question, whether there is agreement to the choice of court
agreement or, put another way, whether a court has, in fact, been "chosen." This
issue remains controlled by domestic contract law, and in the United States, state
law. Even if the Convention were self-executing, see Burbank, supra note 25, it
would not likely reach this important threshold question on which, in mass-
market cases, U.S. courts are developing considerable diversity. To the extent that
contract defenses are raised to challenge choice of court agreements in franchise
situations, the Convention does not purport to control those cases either.
124 Professor Burbank develops the question of whether there is a need for
legislation to implement the Convention in Burbank, supra note 25, at 4-8.
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legislation for the Convention as written and scaling back the U.S.
commitment to the treaty at ratification. But before attempting to
address these questions, however tentatively, the private,
contractual choice of law solution to the problem requires
consideration. If the parties to the choice of court provision could,
through a choice of law provision, fix in advance the law to be
applied to their choice of court provision, they could provide in
advance for enforcement and eliminate the uncertainty that comes
in a multijurisdictional setting. The Convention then might be
ratified by the United States as-is and contracting parties would,
through their judicious selection of courts for their choice of court
provisions, address the problems identified here. The Convention
may facilitate such an approach.
5.1. Choice of Law Provisions as Possible Solutions
The Hague Convention has provisions addressing the law to be
applied by courts at the beginning of the litigation and after a
judgment has been entered. Articles 5, 6, and 9 provide for
enforcement by both chosen and unchosen courts unless the
agreement is "null and void under the law" of the state of the
chosen court.125 Of particular interest to the discussion here is the
provision in Article 6 providing that an unchosen court "shall
suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of
court agreement applies unless the agreement is null and void
under the law of the State of the chosen court."126 Since the "chosen
court" is determined by the drafters of the choice of court
agreement, the Convention awkwardly seems to say that the
parties choose the law to be applied to this foundational question
of agreement by simply selecting the right court. Put differently, it
seems to imply that the law of the chosen court determines the
enforceability of the purported choice of court agreement that
chose that court in the first place. If this is true, then the
Convention-in what seems like a bootstrap approach-seems to
have put into the parties' hands a drafting solution to the problems
identified here. If the drafter simply designates in the agreement a
court whose law she knows will enforce a choice of court agreement
in the given context (here, franchise or mass-market areas), the
125 Hague Convention, supra note 9, arts. 5(1), 6(a) & 9(a).
126 Id. art. 6(a) (emphasis added).
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Convention seems to say that the parties' agreement will find
enforcement in chosen and unchosen courts alike.127
Such an affirmative reading would surely address a core
uncertainty problem whose solution is a legitimate aim of the
Convention, but it is an expansive reading of these provisions that
may not be warranted. As developed below, such a reading is also
at odds with the approach taken by courts in the United States that
have questioned the enforcement of choice of forum agreements.
The more obvious reading of these provisions is far narrower, and
more modest, and shows them to be "savings provisions,"
absolutely essential to save dispute resolution agreements from
inadvertent collapse.
Suppose the parties chose a court that (for whatever reasons)
would not entertain their dispute. Absent these savings provisions
in Articles 5, 6, and 9, they would be truly out of luck. This is
because, absent the savings provisions, Article 6 of the Convention
(requiring the unchosen court to dismiss or suspend its own
proceedings) 128 would require all unchosen courts in contracting
states not to hear a dispute that has a choice of court agreement in
it, even though not enforceable in the chosen court. If the chosen
court would not hear it either (because it was "null and void"
under the law of that chosen court) then the parties' dispute would
127 See INTELLECTUAL PROP.: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNAT'L DISPUTES § 202 (Proposed Final Draft 2007)
(containing a provision analogous to that in the Hague Convention in section 202).
Section 202 may well have been drafted to conform to an aggressive reading of the
Hague Convention's provision. Subsection 2(a) provides (far more directly than
does the Hague Convention) that "a choice-of-court agreement is valid as to form
and substance if it is valid under the law of the designated forum State." But the
section begs the question by using the term "agreement" (rather than "purported
agreement" or "alleged agreement") and goes on to provide in subsection 3
special rules for a court called on to determine the enforceability of a choice of
court agreement in a mass-market contract. Among the criteria the court in that
context should consider are the parties' location, interests, and resources, and "the
interests of any States connected to the dispute or to the parties." Id. § 202(3)(b).
Even if these Principles had the force of law, it seems likely that courts
antagonistic to choice of court agreements in both the franchise and mass-market
contexts discussed here would not look to the law of the court chosen by the
drafter but, rather, would (1) use their own law to determine whether there was an
agreement that would trigger the application of the Principles or (2) find under
subsection 3 that domestic policy would render the choice of court agreement
unenforceable in any event. By the same token, local courts sympathetic to choice
of court agreements under the Principles could easily find them enforceable, even
in mass-market settings under section 202. See generally Constraining Opt-Outs,
supra note 47, at 69 (discussing the Principles' treatment of mass-markets).
128 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
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not, absent these saving provisions, be resolvable in any of the
courts of contracting states. Non-chosen courts could not hear the
dispute because the parties chose a different court, and the chosen
court could not hear it because the agreement was "null and void"
under its own law. Without the savings provisions of Article 6, the
Convention would produce the anomalous result that the dispute
would be subject to resolution only in a non-contracting state.
Even worse, the extent of the parties' bad luck would correlate
directly with the number of countries that joined the Convention
- the more successful the Convention, the fewer non-contracting
states there would be, and the worse the parties' luck would have
become. The savings provisions in Articles 5, 6, and 9 fix this
ironic outcome by permitting the parties in such rare cases to
litigate anywhere they might have litigated before, including
courts of contracting states. 29
The foregoing easily explains why these particular provisions
are essential to the sensible operation of the Convention. But could
they be extended and read affirmatively, as Convention-based
choice of law rules applicable to the choice of court agreements
covered by the Convention?130 While this would place the rules
governing enforceability into the hands of the parties and enhance
certainty, this reading would also have the effect of making choice
of court agreements enforceable, as a matter of contract law, in fora
where they otherwise would not be. In the franchise context, for
example, the franchiser-drafter would choose a distant court that
enforced choice of court agreements in franchise cases. When the
franchisee sued in her unchosen home jurisdiction that was
inhospitable to such provisions, the franchiser would point to the
Hague Convention's Article 6(a) and demand dismissal, arguing
that the Convention points to the chosen court's (not the seized
court's) law as the applicable law governing the enforceability of
the choice of court agreement. Since the agreement would not be
"null and void" in the chosen court, the argument would go, the
unchosen court would be duty bound to dismiss the litigation.
Read aggressively, the provision permits a drafter to select a forum
129 In this respect, the provisions would broadly resemble the rules that
"save" a contractual choice of law provision by projecting the assumption that the
parties could not have intended to choose the law of a jurisdiction that would render
their agreement unenforceable.
130 Cf. Teitz, supra note 1, at 552-53 (describing specific components of the
Convention that were created with the idea of consensus among various legal
systems in mind).
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whose law welcomes choice of court agreements and then bind the
other party to that law - and to the choice of court agreement -
whatever her local jurisdiction thinks about the matter. One could
imagine that a local court, in a case where local law was
inhospitable to choice of court agreements in the case before it,
might be quite resistant to such a reading, however "certain"
choice of court agreements might become as a result.
In the analogous domestic setting where the drafter adds a
separate choice of (hospitable) law clause to the contract to bolster
its choice of forum provision, domestic courts have taken a
negative view of this bootstrap effort to change the otherwise
applicable rules. Some examples will make this clearer. In Kubis &
Perszyk Associates, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,131 the contract
chose California both as the forum for disputes and as the
applicable law for the New Jersey franchisee who (without the
choice of law clause, at least) enjoyed the legal protection of the
New Jersey Franchise Practices Act.132 The New Jersey Supreme
Court predicated its rejection of the choice of California courts on
its rejection of this choice of California law.133 New Jersey law
governed. And while the underlying franchise contract in
Nagrampa v. MailCoups chose the law of Massachusetts to govern
the California franchise (and the choice of forum provision within
the franchise contract), the franchiser apparently conceded that
California law governed, 134 despite the fact that California law was
predictably inhospitable.
While there is some difference of opinion,135 the same approach
is true for mass-market contracts, at least in those places where
challenges to arbitration provisions have been successful. In Aral v.
Earthlink, Inc.,136 the court concluded that California law applied to
131 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996).
132 Franchise Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-1 (2001).
133 Kubis, 680 A.2d at 627 (holding that forum-selection clauses in contracts
subject to the New Jersey Franchise Act are presumptively invalid). See supra text
accompanying note 74.
134 See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (" [B]oth parties have proceeded throughout the district court and on appeal
on the assumption that the franchise agreement is governed by California law.").
135 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law,
Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 1, 11-14 (2006) (discussing the
advantages of choice of law clauses, particularly in consumer and small business
settings).
136 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2005).
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the California class action despite a choice of Delaware law
provision in the service agreement. 37 Similarly, in rejecting the
contract's choice of Delaware law, the Wisconsin court in Coady v.
Cross Country Bank, Inc.138 stated the applicable Wisconsin rule:
"parties are generally free to contract for choice of law, although
not 'at the expense of important public policies of a state whose
law would be applicable if the parties['] choice of law provision
were disregarded."' 139
If the Convention were self-executing,140 Articles 5, 6, and 9
might be read aggressively to create a federal choice of law rule,
binding on states under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. But
a court would have to so conclude, and such a conclusion seems
dubious at least in some jurisdictions.
For the Convention's purported choice of law rule to apply, a
court would first have to conclude that the Convention itself
applied to the transaction. But the Convention itself doesn't apply
unless there is a covered choice of court agreement14l and some
choice of law rule other than the Convention's must be employed
at the threshold in order to find the agreement that is a prerequisite
to the Convention's applicability. Unless a court can conclude that
such an agreement exists, the Convention-and its rules in Articles
5, 6, and 9 (whatever they may mean) -simply don't apply. The
domestic precedents arising under the Federal Arbitration Act,
which of necessity are contract law precedents, will be applicable
in the first instance to cases that may be within the reach of the
Convention; the Convention's purported choice of law provision
137 This decision followed an exhaustive analysis of the problem in Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). See Aral, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 242
("The possibility of redress in small claims court does not persuade us that a
patently unreasonable forum selection clause should be enforced.").
138 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
139 Id. at 737 (citing Bush v. Nat'l Sch. Studios, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 883 (Wis.
1987)). See also Firchow v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. B187081, 2007 WL 64763 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2007) (rejecting the application of a South Dakota law to a class
action waiver affecting California residents).
140 "At a general level, a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that
may be enforced in the courts without prior legislation by Congress, and a non-
self-executing treaty, conversely, as a treaty that may not be enforced in the courts
without prior legislative 'implementation."' Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995).
141 The "Convention shall apply in international cases to exclusive choice of
court agreements .... ".Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(1) (emphasis
added).
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should not change that because "agreement" is a prerequisite to
the Convention's applicability.142 In any event, since the provisions
in Articles 5, 6, and 9 can sensibly be read as savings provisions, as
discussed above, there would be no need for the local court to take
a contrary, expansive view of the provisions.
Finally, even if the Convention's provisions were aggressively
read as choice of law rules for deciding the underlying contract
questions, any unchosen court could easily avoid enforcement
using the Convention's public policy exception.143 Local public
policy is, after all, partly behind the accumulating domestic
decisions that avoid choice of forum provisions in certain
situations. Thus, even if an unchosen court were to interpret
Articles 5, 6, and 9 as requiring it to apply the law the parties
purportedly agreed to in order to determine whether that
agreement itself exists, it seems extremely unlikely that this would
prompt the unchosen court to recognize a choice of court
agreement that it would not otherwise enforce. Thus, it is difficult
to conclude that the Convention itself reliably solves this
uncertainty.
5.2. Affirmative Legislative Solutions
Since the Convention's conflict of law rules can only operate on
a purported agreement covered by the Convention, and since the
public policy exception is wide enough to accommodate judicial
hostility to choice of court agreements in the franchise and mass-
market areas, one must look elsewhere to generate the certainty
and uniformity of enforcement within the United States to which
the Convention seems to aspire. Construing the Convention's
public policy exceptions as broad enough to cover all these cases
and jurisdictions is at odds with the narrow construction of public
policy intended by the drafters in the interests of certainty. If a
contracting state has "unruly courts" that will not enforce the
choice of court agreements that a state, by joining the Convention,
has committed to enforce, an obvious solution is for the contracting
142 See generally Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 47, at 16-17 (describing the
contract and choice of law analyses necessary to determine whether the
Convention's provisions apply).
143 The public policy to be recognized at the contract stage is that of the state
of the "seised court" and at the judgment stage is that of the state of the
"requested court." Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 6(c) & art. 9(e). No
choice of law analysis will overcome the clear intent of the Convention on this
issue.
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state to bring the courts into line. In the United States,
implementing legislation is a direct solution. This can occur either
at the state or federal level though it is most often accomplished at
the federal level.
It is important to recognize the character of the legislative
solutions needed to address the problems identified here. In the
franchise area, the legislation would have to change the state law
in those jurisdictions that refuse to enforce choice of court
agreements, at least for international franchise cases. In the mass-
market area, the legislation would have to essentially overrule the
developing precedents that refuse to enforce choice of forum
clauses when they deprive the customer of a class remedy.
Legislative solutions such as these will be very difficult to achieve
either at the state or federal levels.
5.2.1. The Uniform State Laws Solution
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") has developed a uniform law designed to
harmonize state law and thereby advance the underlying goals of
the Convention.14 Professor Curtis Reitz has pointed to this
modern uniform draft in the context of the Hague Convention.145
The draft Uniform Act is directed to domestic recognition of
foreign money judgments generally and is a successor to a similar
uniform law 146 promulgated by NCCUSL and currently enacted in
some thirty states. 147 The draft statute is not directed specifically to
the enforcement of judgments arising out of choice of court
agreements, although it does address them in passing.
144 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A.
pt. 2, at 5 (Supp. 2006).
145 Reitz, supra note 25, at 307.
146 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 39
(Supp. 2006).
147 Teitz, supra note 1, at 547.
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Among the many reasons 48 a court "need not" recognize a
foreign money judgment (including, of course, an exception based
in the forum's public policy), is an exception in Section 4(c)(5) for
those judgments in which "the proceeding in the foreign court was
contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the
dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by
148 The Uniform Act provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a court of
this state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which this [act]
applies.
(b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
(c) A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment
if:
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the
defendant to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing
party of an adequate opportunity to present its case;
(3) the judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which
the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state
or of the United States;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be
determined otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court;
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the
action;
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise
substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with
respect to the judgment; or
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the
judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process
of law.
(d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the
burden of establishing that a ground for non-recognition stated in
subsection (b) or (c) exists.
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNMON ACT § 4.
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proceedings in that foreign court." 149 Put into the vocabulary used
here in connection with the Hague Convention, a local court under
the draft legislation might deny enforcement of a judgment where
the judgment resulted from litigation in a "non-chosen" court.
While commentary emphasizes that the enforcing court must find
a valid choice of forum agreement for this exception to work,150 the
draft statute does not address how the forum court is to determine
whether there was an agreement.
This, and the public policy exception more directly, will permit
the diversity of state law views on choice of forum agreements in
these contexts to flourish under the draft Uniform statute. Foreign
parties who disobey their choice of court provision and litigate
elsewhere may or may not - depending on the U.S. state court's
view of the contract issues underlying the choice of court
provision-wind up with a judgment that will be recognized
under NCCUSL's draft statute.
The draft statute also connects to choice of court agreements
covered by the Hague Convention. Section 5 of the draft statute
forbids the forum court from denying recognition on account of the
rendering court's lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
(one of the grounds for non-recognition listed in Section 4)151 if "the
defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the
subject matter involved." 152 Once again, the enforcing court must
find a valid agreement covering the subject matter in order for this
provision to bind the defendant; once again, the forum court will
look to diverse state contract law in order to rule on the question.
Perhaps because it is focused on recognition of foreign
judgments generally, the uniform act simply does not address the
diversity in state law that will make enforcement of choice of court
agreements, and recognition and enforcement of the judgments
that proceed from them, difficult in the United States. If domestic
ratification of the Hague Convention requires, either legally or
practically, some harmonization of state law on the issues
discussed here, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act does not do the job.
But could we develop a uniform law, to be enacted by the states
149 Id. § 4(c)(5) (emphasis added).
150 Id. § 4, cmt. 9.
151 Id. § 4(b)(2).
152 Id. § 5(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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that would solve the problems in implementing the Hague
Convention identified here? It seems extremely doubtful.
The NCCUSL has never been particularly successful in
harmonizing the law when states have strongly held, diverse views
on underlying policy. The need to persuade the legislatures of
many diverse states to enact one uniform text surely works its way
into the NCCUSL drafting process. The result usually is a high-
quality legal product that, in order to be successful, does not take a
stand on controversial issues, but avoids them.1 5 3 When the
drafters in recent years have taken stands on issues on which states
have diverse views, the results have been less than satisfying.
Nearing its fourtieth birthday, the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, a uniform law addressing excesses in the consumer credit
industry, has achieved only eleven enactments in all that time.154
Current Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code dodged the
question of horizontal privity in breach of warranty settings by
creating three alternative rules from which states could choose. 55
More recently, the revision of Article 2, promulgated for enactment
in 2003156 has not been enacted in any state. There is nothing in the
proposed Article 2 revisions that addresses issues nearly as
divisive in state law as how to treat franchisees, or the recipients of
mass-market forms with class action waivers in them.
A final example is presented by Revised Article 1 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The drafters did not take on the
potentially divisive question "how to treat choice of forum"
provisions at all, but it did attempt to craft a new, modern
contractual choice of law rule, one that liberalized the law by
permitting more "party autonomy" in most cases and offered
explicit protection to "consumers." 15 7 In every one of the twenty-
nine states that has enacted Revised Article 1, 158 this new rule has
153 Woodward, supra note 58, at 1521-25.
154 The statute was first promulgated in 1968. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIr CODE,
7 U.L.A. pt. 3, at 88 (2002).
155 U.C.C. § 2-318 (2004).
156 U.C.C. art. 2, 1 U.L.A. 21 (supp. 2006).
157 U.C.C. § 1-301 (2004). The provision and the controversial nature of its
underlying policy are developed in William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of
Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697 (2001). As
elsewhere throughout the U.C.C., the category of contracts or persons entitled to
enhanced protection, "consumers," was defined narrowly, with the category
depending on the use to which the buyer put the product. UCC § 1-201(11).
158 See Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But (Still) Not Yet Duplicated,
Revised UCC Article 1, 38 U.C.C.L.S. 195 (2006), updated version available at
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been jettisoned and replaced by the uncontroversial, old rule which
was developed in the 1950s.1 59
If one assumes that the diversity in state law with respect to
enforcing choice of court agreements in franchise and mass-market
contracts is a problem to be addressed by legislation, nothing in the
long, distinguished history of the uniform state laws process
suggests that NCCUSL can do it.
5.2.2. The Federal Legislation Solution
The difficulty NCCUSL would have with harmonizing diverse
state law in these areas is largely a political one because it would
require states to include provisions on which some states strongly
disagree, and not enough state legislatures will enact the proposed
statute. Congress, of course, has the power to force unity through
federal legislation, whatever the state legislatures may wish.
Federal legislation also has the distinct advantage of producing a
more uniform approach. One text applies in all states, 160 and
conflicts between the judicial decisions of different jurisdictions
can be decided by the Supreme Court.161
The problems with federal legislation as a solution for the
diversity described here are several. First, the diverse views of
appropriate policy do not disappear when Congress begins its
work; those problems simply show up as political obstacles to
creating and enacting a uniform federal solution. In the mass-
market area, the eight states that have thus far refused enforcement
of arbitration provisions because they deprive customers of class
action remedies are large states. 162 Thirteen states refuse to enforce
http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/ral-updates.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2007) (discussing the importance of Article 1 of the U.C.C.).
159 See id. at 11 (listing states which have adopted the revised Article 1 of the
U.C.C.). While U.C.C. § 1-105 states a uniform choice of law rule for contracts
covered by the U.C.C., its terms are sufficiently broad and vague as to leave
unstated the solutions to the mass market cases identified here (the U.C.C. will
not typically apply to franchise terminations). No case has been found where a
defendant successfully utilized U.C.C. § 1-105 to deflect a challenge to a choice of
law provision as unconscionable or in violation of public policy.
160 The uniform laws process often results in non-uniform amendments to the
uniform legislation; that is, textual variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This
is particularly true in areas where the uniform legislation attempts to address an
area in which states are divided.
161 Cf. Burbank, supra note 25, at 20-21. See generally Hollis, supra note 26, at
1344-54.
162 See sources cited supra note 43.
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choice of forum provisions in franchise cases.163 In both settings,
the decisions have not been "merely" common law decisions;
rather, they are decisions that implement state legislative schemes
or procedural rules passed by other deliberative political bodies. It
would not be easy to create federal legislation that would overrule
the legislatures and courts of these states so as to make choice of
court agreements enforceable in these debatable areas. Put
differently, a federal legislative solution will be controversial and
difficult politically and, given the other issues competing for
Congressional attention, it seems very unlikely that this kind of
solution would make it on to Congress's crowded agenda.164
A second problem with a federal mandate to enforce choice of
court agreements in Hague-covered franchise and mass-
market/non-"consumer" contracts is that presumably the federal
solution would extend only to international contracts covered by
the Convention. 65 This presents us with the prospect of disparate
treatment of franchisees and mass-market customers within a
given state depending on whether their choice of court provision
was or was not covered by the Hague Convention and
163 See Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 773 (discussing which states refused to
enforce choice of forum provisions).
164 The ALI Judgments Project would not solve the problems described here.
It requires domestic courts asked to recognize or enforce a judgment (including,
apparently, one predicated on a choice of court agreement covered by the Hague
Convention) to refuse enforcement if the judgment is "repugnant to the public
policy of... a particular state of the United States when the relevant legal interest,
right, or policy is regulated by state law." ALI JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 39,
§ 5(a)(vi). Foreign judgments, entered pursuant to purported choice of court
agreements, against franchisees would likely fit this exception quite easily. Its
focus being on recognizing and enforcing judgments, the ALI Judgments Project
says nothing of a domestic court exercising jurisdiction in violation of a purported
choice of court agreement. But it does touch our subject at the judgment
enforcement stage. A domestic court must refuse recognition or enforcement if
"the party resisting recognition or enforcement establishes that the judgment
resulted from a proceeding undertaken contrary to an agreement under which the
dispute was to be determined exclusively in another forum." ALI JUDGMENTS
PROJECT, supra note 39, § 5(b)(i). Of course, the provision begs the question
whether there was "an agreement" choosing the foreign court. At least in cases
where the defendant has not contested that contract question in the foreign court,
the recognizing or enforcing court will have to make that threshold determination
and the contract law that the forum's choice of law rule selected would probably
be used to make it.
165 Congress probably has the power under the Commerce Clause to address
the enforceability of choice of court agreements generally in both franchise
contracts and in mass-market contracts. But federalizing these areas is yet more
intrusive on traditional state lawmaking and politically even less likely.
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accompanying federal rule.166 Assuming that choice of court
agreements are more valuable to vendors when they are
enforceable than not, this prospect would give at least a theoretical
competitive advantage to international vendors over their
domestic counterparts in those states where enforcement is
currently refused. While it seems extremely doubtful that the
incentives created by such disparate treatment would prompt
domestic vendors to move offshore to take advantage of the Hague
Convention and its then-accompanying federal legislation, the
situation would at minimum exacerbate the political problems
Congress would face in crafting a solution in the first place.
A final reason -militating against federal legislation is that a
federal solution may simply be ill-advised in our federal system.
We have a very long and rich tradition of local rule at the state
level. This tradition has, amazingly, continued in commercial law
where one might have thought that the business need for low
transaction and compliance costs would long ago have moved
commercial law into the federal domain. We remain doggedly
committed to state level commercial law, and to the related state
law that protects various customers and others. Overriding
strongly held, locally developed policy with a federal solution
seems unwarranted unless the need for a uniform solution is
overwhelming. Doing so in order to credibly join the Hague
Choice of Court Convention seems ill-advised.
5.3. Why Do Anything?
Another alternative is to simply ratify the Convention without
directly addressing these lines of cases with corrective
legislation. 167 One can imagine the view that the public policy
166 Problems with imposing a treaty's provisions on domestic states that
might have different views of policy have led to the rejection of some treaties by
the executive branch. See Hollis, supra note 26, at 1372.
167 The United States could ratify the Convention and allow it to be self-
executing. See Vizquez, supra note 140 (explaining and discussing self-execution).
Then the courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will eventually determine,
among other things, the meaning of Articles 5, 6, and 9 and whether the public
policy exception accommodates the diverse views of states on the matters
addressed here. This is, of course, a very good recipe for a sustained, perhaps
interminable, period of uncertainty -something that would seriously undercut
the benefits of the Convention. It would seem to make little sense to ratify this
Convention without some effort to address the diversity of U.S. state views on the
kinds of contracts involved here. Cf. Reitz, supra note 25, at 319.
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exception was developed for just such cases.168 It seems more
likely, however, that the public policy exception was to work on
exceptional cases, not entire classes of cases of the kinds I have
described here. The overall structure of the Convention suggests
that doing nothing might well be at odds with the underlying
thrust of the Convention.
Reciprocity is a strong underlying theme in the Convention.
This reciprocity is reflected in the Convention's list of excluded
contracts and in the inference one draws from that list, that choice
of court provisions in contracts that are not excluded will be
enforced by contracting states. It is also evident in Article 21 of the
Convention. This provision permits a state at the ratification stage
to exclude specific matters or contracts if the state has a "strong
interest" in doing so. Importantly, there is explicit reciprocity built
in for the classes of cases identified in such a Declaration - if a state
describes and excludes a kind of contract under Article 21, that
kind of contract is excluded from the commitment of other states
when dealing with the contracts of the excluding state.169 The same
is true for Article 22, which provides for reciprocal enforcement of
judgments arising from non-exclusive choice of court agreements
168 Cf. Teitz, supra note 1, at 552. The negotiations from which the
Convention emerged probably preceded the developments described here in the
mass-market cases; these cases may truly have been "exceptional" at that time.
On the other hand, the franchise cases have been with us for a much longer time.
As early as 1980, a federal district court in Wisconsin rejected, on the basis of
Wisconsin's franchisee protection statutes, a choice of forum provision that would
send litigation with a Wisconsin franchisee to Illinois. Lulling v. Barnaby's Family
Inns Inc., 482 F. Supp. 318, 323 (E.D. Wis. 1980). It is hard to understand the
absence of an exception for franchise cases in the Convention.
169 The Convention explicitly provides for declarations at the time of
ratification:
Article 21 Declarations with respect to specific matters
1. Where a state has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to a
specific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the
Convention to that matter. The State making such a declaration shall
ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the
specific matter excluded is clearly and precisely defined.
2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply a) in the
Contracting State that made the declaration; b) in other Contracting States,
where an exclusive choice of court agreement designates the courts, or one or
more specific courts, of the State that made the declaration.
Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 21 (emphasis added).
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where the rendering and enforcing jurisdictions have both made
appropriate declarations. 170
In a unified legal system, the situation is a good deal clearer
than it is in a non-unified system such as ours. Consider, for
example, a state with a unified legal system whose courts refused
to enforce choice of court agreements in franchise cases. Would it
be proper for such a state to join and ratify the Convention without
addressing its franchise law? The state could, of course, believe or
argue that the public policy exceptions would encompass such
cases and that, therefore, there was no need to address the problem
either through local legislation that changed the domestic franchise
law, or through a Declaration that excluded franchise contracts
from that state's obligations - and the reciprocal obligations of
other states- under Article 21 of the Convention.
But considering the Convention as a whole, and its approach to
excluding whole classes of contracts and contractual matters, this
hypothetical state's approach would be at odds with the
commitment that it, as a contracting state, makes when embracing
the Convention. The public policy exceptions seem designed for
case-by-case exclusions based on the unique, "exceptional" 171
situations that inevitably turn up in litigation, not as loopholes for
unilateral exclusion of whole classes of contracts. Joining the treaty
without addressing this hypothetical state's inconsistent views on
franchise contracts seems inconsistent with the undertaking a state
takes when it makes a treaty commitment. 172
Moreover, whatever the demands of international law, this
hypothetical state's approach would create a lopsided Convention,
at least with respect to its franchise contracts. Thus, in the
example, the contracting state would not be enforcing choice of
court agreements involving its own franchisees but other
contracting states would be enforcing choice of court agreements
when their own franchisees were the recipients. Article 21 is
designed to keep Convention obligations reciprocal among
170 Hague Convention, supra note 127, art. 22.
171 Cf. Teitz, supra note 1, at 550 (explaining how the structure of the
Convention is designed to facilitate the harmonization of a myriad of laws,
traditions, and political agendas such that a public policy exception need not be
relied upon for non-extraordinary cases).
172 See Vienna Convention, supra note 113, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
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contracting states and one would expect a unified state to make
such a Declaration under the circumstances supposed.
How apt is this hypothetical example in the U.S. system where
the state law that would recognize choice of court agreements is, as
developed above, diverse and only partially antagonistic to some
classes of choice of court contracts covered by the Convention,
rather than uniformly so? It is not the case that the majority of U.S.
courts have refused to recognize choice of court agreements either
in franchise situations or in mass-market contracts. Could the
United States ratify the Convention without addressing the fact
that in some predictable constituent jurisdictions, choice of court
agreements will encounter great difficulty finding enforcement? If
the exceptions to reliable enforcement were minor or
unpredictable, perhaps the public policy exceptions could cover
them. But these are not freak, unusual cases. With franchise and
mass-market 173 contracts, we have important and populous
jurisdictions such as California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania
whose law, as it now stands, will in many cases predictably refuse
enforcement of choice of court agreements in those contract areas.
Where divergent views with respect to definable classes of cases
are predictable, as they seem to be in these two areas of
Convention-covered contracts, the "manifest public policy"
approach seems questionable, given the aims and design of the
Convention.174
173 Professor Teitz reports that, with respect to the kinds of contracts I have
described as "mass-market contracts," that "[i]t was ultimately left for the non-
chosen or requested court to decide whether such a contract or the resulting
judgment would not be enforced because it is 'manifestly contrary' to the forum's
public policy." Teitz, supra note 1, at 552-53. Convention negotiations preceded
most of the developments in mass-market cases described here. See cases cited
supra note 43. The legal scene in the United States has changed and the question
becomes whether the United States should take some steps in response to those
changes in order to make the Convention a success. Certainly, the public policy
exception could accommodate the divergent state law that I have described here
and no doubt will if the United States joins the Convention as drafted and
Congress or state legislatures take no action. The more difficult question is
whether such a U.S. decision to pull the aberrant jurisdictions' approaches
through the "manifest public policy" loophole is sound as a policy matter, given
the overall thrust of the Convention and the need for U.S. leadership to encourage
broad ratification.
174 The strong reciprocity design of the Convention suggests that the public
policy exception may be better suited to the odd, unpredictable cases with
compelling facts than to an entire class of cases. Indeed, even if the rejection of
the Convention's enforcement rule were present in only one constituent
jurisdiction, one might well expect the Contracting State to address the law of that
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Important as may be the United States' legal obligations to
uniformly enforce choice of court agreements in these areas if it
enters the Convention, they may be secondary to a very practical
problem. As the law now stands in the United States, ratification
of the Convention without addressing these areas in some way will
yield a lopsided Convention, tilted in favor of the United States.
This lopsidedness, whatever it may mean as a legal matter, may
impede our efforts to persuade other countries to join the
Convention. 75
6. RATIFICATION SOLUTIONS
6.1. Reciprocity and Ratification
The Hague Choice of Court Convention has largely been a U.S.
initiative spawned by the problem of obtaining recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad; other countries have
comparatively little difficulty enforcing their judgments in the
United States. 76 The United States was motivated to change the
status quo - to level the playing field - but its lack of leverage with
respect to reciprocal enforcement of judgments resulted in a
disappointing outcome. As two commentators expressed it,
"[hioping to build a skyscraper, the United States has succeeded in
constructing, at most, a low hut." 77 While this may seriously
understate the very substantial accomplishment of the
Conference, 7 8 these many years of effort will not even yield a "low
hut" if only a couple of states became interested in joining the
Convention.
One wonders as an initial matter what might motivate
constituent jurisdiction in the interests of the larger good coming from good faith
ratification of the Convention and the commitment to enforcement that it
represents.
175 States with unified legal systems are familiar with the lopsidedness of
treaty obligations that can result when federal States take leeway to accommodate
their federalism concerns; unified States sometimes resist giving those federal
States the leeway. See Hollis, supra note 26, at 1375-77 (discussing the two main
problems that hinder the widespread use of federal-state clauses).
176 See generally Adler & Zarychta, supra note 1 (explaining the history
preceding the signing of the Convention and the subsequent results of the treaty);
Teitz, supra note 1, at 544-50 (discussing the negotiations leading up to the
Convention).
177 Adler & Zarychta, supra note 1, at 2.
178 See supra text accompanying note 6.
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potential contracting states to join the Convention even in the best
of circumstances. Difficulty in enforcing U.S. judgments abroad
means that our businesses must arbitrate their claims or, if they
litigate, either (1) litigate their claims abroad, or (2) risk non-
enforcement if they litigate those claims in the United States and
then seek recognition or enforcement abroad. Foreign businesses
do not face the same risks when they do business with U.S. firms.
Because they can effectively choose more fora for litigation, they
enjoy an advantage over our businesses. The status quo is now
tilted favorably in the direction of those who obtain judgments
abroad, bring them to the United States, and generally get the
recognition and enforcement that their own courts might not offer
were the situation reversed. The Hague Convention, with its
implicit reciprocity, will level the playing field. But a level playing
field may be perceived as a relative disadvantage for those who
now enjoy advantage from the lopsided status quo.
Now, of course, the Convention is consistent with free market
ideology;179 leveling the playing field removes the differential
difficulty of enforcing some judgments from the array of legal
factors that might perversely motivate business decisions.
Moreover, if the research regarding business' preference for
judicial dispute resolution over arbitration 180  holds for
international agreements, potential contracting states (or their
constituent businesses) might perceive the general economic
benefits of joining the Convention to exceed the benefits they now
enjoy from a lopsided status quo. Perhaps the ideology of the free
market, or a forecast of other indirect benefits, 181 will prompt states
to trade their narrow advantages for a larger pie for everyone and
179 Cf. Teitz, supra note 1, at 557 (suggesting the Convention as a means to
promote free trade).
180 See id. at 548 (supplying anecdotal evidence supporting a strong
preference by practitioners for designating litigation instead of arbitration in their
contracts).
181 One consequence of the present status quo might well be that U.S. firms
do much of their international business on the condition that the contract contain
arbitration provisions. Certainly, with the current absence of any treaty-based
obligation to enforce other States' judgments, many American lawyers would
advise their business clients to demand arbitration provisions in their contracts so
that the New York Convention will apply and yield enforcement. If, indeed, most
businesses would prefer judicial dispute resolution to arbitration, and if doing
international business with U.S. firms typically requires arbitration because of the
status quo, then the Hague Convention would indirectly benefit foreign
businesses by removing barriers, demanded by hypothesis by U.S. firms, to
judicial dispute resolution.
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join the Convention. To one who was not privy to the negotiations,
it seems a bit of a long shot.
The long shot turns into overwhelming worse odds if, in fact,
the Convention is perceived as not merely shifting an
advantageous situation into "neutral," but as reversing the
advantage to favor the United States. The cases in the two areas
discussed here suggest that this may well be the case: the United
States will enjoy an "advantage," as it were, if it ratifies the
Convention without addressing the diverse domestic law in these
two areas. As suggested earlier, addressing the diverse state law
using either a federal or state legislative process will be very
difficult, if not impossible, politically. "Addressing" it by allowing
the Convention to be self-executing will result in a sustained
period of uncertainty about U.S. law that will impede ratification
by other states. Unilateral options at ratification that would scale
back the United States' commitment to the treaty182 might solve the
legal compliance problems but, similarly, would produce
lopsidedness in obligations that, under the circumstances, would
likely impede widespread ratification. 183
As noted above, Article 21 of the Convention presents another
option, one that the United States should seriously consider if it
proceeds to join the Convention.
6.2. Limited Ratification
Article 21 of the Hague Convention provides:
1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this
Convention to a specific matter, that State may declare that
it will not apply the Convention to that matter. The State
making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration
is no broader than necessary and that the specific matter
excluded is clearly and precisely defined.
2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not
apply -
182 The United States could attach a reservation at ratification in the interests
of federalism as it did when ratifying the U.N. Convention Against Organized
Crime. Hollis, supra note 26, at 1361. But, as the text suggests, such a unilateral
approach would upset the Convention's balance and, more importantly, likely
reduce the odds of a successful Convention.
183 See infra text accompanying note 184.
20081
U. Pa. J. In t'l L.
a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;
b) in other Contracting States, where an exclusive choice
of court agreement designates the courts, or one or more
specific courts, of the State that made the declaration.
Article 21, paragraph 2(b) reinforces the reciprocity principle
that is the bedrock for the entire Convention. If a contracting state
declares the Convention inapplicable to some category of contracts
or matters, those excluded agreements are carved out of the
reciprocal commitments the Convention imposes on other states in
their dealings with the Declaring state as well: if, for example, the
United States was not committed by the Convention to enforce a
choice of court agreement in a franchise agreement designating a
Canadian court, Canadian courts would not be obligated by the
Convention to enforce such agreements designating U.S. courts if
suit were brought in Canada. Article 21 is a mechanism for
recognizing the diversity in policy views of contracting states and
allows for customization of the Convention to accommodate those
views while maintaining its reciprocity principle. Article 21
reinforces the point made earlier: that the Convention conveys an
expectation that a contracting state whose courts refuse to enforce
some category of covered choice of court agreements ought not
ratify the Convention without either changing its law or making an
Article 21 declaration.
It is important to note that a Declaration under the Convention
merely removes from courts the obligation under the Convention to
enforce choice of court agreements in the defined category; a
Declaration would not mandate non-enforcement of the choice of
court agreement in the category so designated. Rather, the
background law of the forum (chosen or unchosen) will remain for
considering the effect of the choice of court agreement on the
forum's decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction, or on its
decision whether or not to recognize or enforce a judgment. In the
substantial majority of state and federal courts in the United States,
this would likely mean enforcement of choice of court agreements
in these excluded categories both at beginning and end points of
the dispute resolution process.
In the United States, the effect of an Article 21 Declaration
would be to permit the diverse state law in these areas to continue
to develop as it traditionally has. Were we to make such a
Declaration, then in all other contracting states, local law, rather
[Vol. 29:3
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than the Convention, would govern the effect a forum would give
to a purported choice of court agreement, or a judgment resulting
from one, in these defined categories. It is by no means clear that
other contracting states would refuse enforcement of choice of
court agreements in the U.S.-defined categories merely because
they were no longer covered by the United States contracting state
version of the Convention.
Article 21 requires that a contracting state have a "strong
interest" in excluding a category of cases from enforcement. In a
unitary legal system whose background law denies enforcement to
a category of choice of court agreements covered by the
Convention, the choice at the ratification stage is clear: either
change the background law in order to comply with the
Convention as written, or carve out that category of cases through
an Article 21 Declaration on the basis of the "strong interest"
underlying the refusal of enforcement.
But does the United States have a "strong interest" in refusing
to enforce choice of court agreements in either franchise or mass-
market cases? While our diversity in views creates predictability
problems not present in unitary systems, in both instances, these
are minority views, strongly held as they may be.
But what of our strong commitment to federalism itself,
reflected in our counterintuitive commitment to state level
commercial law in the face of increasing pressures of globalization?
Surely the United States could base a Declaration on our interest in
maintaining the diversity of our evolving state law on these
matters on which state policy varies and then "clearly and
suitably" define the categories of cases for these purposes. Indeed,
Professor Hollis details a long history of the United States limiting
its treaty obligations in the interests of preserving its brand of
federalism.184 Making an Article 21 Declaration would mean that
other contracting states would not be obligated by the Convention to
enforce choice of court agreements in the cases we so define when
our businesses are seeking enforcement of agreements designating
U.S. courts in their courts. The local law governing enforcement of
choice of forum provisions and judgments resulting from them
would continue to operate and develop in those settings.
184 See generally, Hollis, supra note 26 (discussing the extent to which
federalism constrains the Article II treaty power).
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6.3. Defining the Candidates for Exclusion
In both franchise and mass-market settings, the object would be
to define the areas where the case law is evolving so that it could
continue to evolve under our federal system. Since the definitions
we develop will apply in other contracting states, it is also
important to define the exclusions as narrowly as possible to
maximize the Convention's intended effect. We have generally
identified franchise contracts and mass-market contracts as the
important areas for exclusion. Neither has been adequately
defined for purposes of Article 21 and different considerations go
into defining these distinct areas. In the franchise area, states
themselves define what franchises are and the extent to which state
legislation will apply to them. For mass-market contracts, there is
no legislative definition as such; the category itself is a construct
derived from class action waiver cases.
6.3.1. Franchise Contracts
Since the courts denying enforcement of choice of forum
provisions in franchise agreements are, typically, proceeding under
local state franchise legislation, that legislation should be looked to
in order to craft a suitable, narrowly defined Declaration in the
Convention. An appendix to this article contains a sample of
definitions found in those states that have refused to enforce choice
of forum provisions in contracts involving their franchisees.
The Convention requires that "[t]he State making such a
declaration shall ensure that the declaration is no broader than
necessary and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and
precisely defined." 18 5 This presents a problem because (as might
be expected) U.S. states define franchises differently. A domestic
court that is inhospitable to a choice of court provision in a
franchise contract will likely refuse to enforce it under its own law,
whatever the Convention might provide. While the drafting task is
to create a definition that is no broader than it needs to be, the
reciprocity policy requires that it be broad enough to cover any
franchise contract whose choice of court agreement would not find
enforcement in a U.S. jurisdiction. The common theme that
emerges from the definitions is the franchisee's use of the
franchiser's trademark or related intellectual property rights in its
business of selling goods or services.
185 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 21, para. 1.
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New Jersey has a particularly strong policy in this respect and
its definition is elegant, brief, and would cover the franchises that
are more specifically defined in other state legislation. 186  Its
legislation provides:
"Franchise" means a written arrangement for a definite or
indefinite period, in which a person grants to another
person a license to use a trade name, trade mark, service
mark, or related characteristics, and in which there is a
community of interest in the marketing of goods or services
at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or otherwise. 87
A workable Declaration could be created from this definition.
6.3.2. Mass-market Contracts
The assumption thus far is that the United States could, if it
were thought to be sound policy, exclude under Article 21
adequately defined "mass-market contracts" from the scope of its
ratification in the interests of advancing the reciprocity goals of the
Convention. The Convention is, unfortunately, more complicated.
In Article 2, paragraph 1, the Convention excludes from its
scope both consumer and employment contracts. 88 Consumer
contracts are defined by reference to one of the parties to the
contract 189 coming within the Convention's implicit definition of
"consumer." Contracts that "relate[] to contracts of employment,
including collective agreements" are excluded as well.190 Article 2,
Paragraph 2, then provides that the "Convention shall not apply to
the following matters" and sets forth the long list quoted above. 191
Is there significance to this apparent distinction between
contracts and matters? Article 21 provides that a state might make a
186 New Jersey's definition limits coverage to "written" agreements whereas
other states include oral franchise agreements in their definitions. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:10-3 (2001). Since the Hague Convention requires that a choice of court
agreement be in writing or the equivalent, New Jersey's writing requirement
poses no problem for purposes of creating a workable Declaration. Hague
Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(c)(i).
187 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-3(a) (2001).
188 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis supplied).
189 "This Convention shall not apply to exclusive choice of court agreements
-a) to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household
purposes (a consumer) is a party." Id. art. 2, para. 1(a).
190 Id. art. 2, para. 1(b).
191 Id. art. 2, para. 2 (emphasis supplied); see supra note 19.
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"Declaration with respect to certain matters".192 If there is a method
to the division within Article 2 for purposes of Article 21, the
Convention might limit what a state might exclude through an
Article 21 Declaration. Agreements involving franchisees or
franchise agreements could clearly coexist with the other "matters"
on the list in Paragraph 2 had the drafters seen fit to include them.
But "mass-market contracts" seem different and more closely
resemble "consumer contracts" defined in the other section; the
section that does not use the word "matters." The narrowness of
the consumer definition was, apparently, an issue during the
negotiations and those pressing for a broader definition did not
prevail. 93  One might argue that this point, having been
negotiated, is not open to renegotiation through an Article 21
Declaration.
Whatever weight one assigned to the division in terms within
Article 2 as a drafting matter, a reading that barred the United
States from defining under Article 21 "mass-market contracts" as
an excluded category under the circumstances discussed here
would be at odds with the thrust and ultimate success of the
Convention. If such a Declaration is not permissible, the United
States would likely be faced with the unpalatable options of not
joining the Convention at all, joining it as drafted without a mass-
market contract Declaration under Article 21, or joining it with
unilateral reservations, understandings, or declarations apart from
Article 21. Only an Article 21 Declaration would preserve the
reciprocity implicit in the Convention's design by explicitly
carving the defined contracts out of the obligations of other states,
thereby maintaining balance. Absent an Article 21 Declaration,
other states that perceived the developing mass-market cases to be
problematic might refuse to join the Convention until it was
perceived to operate in a reciprocal manner in the United States.
This delay would further dampen the enthusiasm that naturally
follows a newly concluded accord. Given the potential for the
Convention to make inroads into the longstanding problem of
international recognition and enforcement of judgments, any
obstacle to widespread ratification of the Convention would be
very unfortunate. So, whatever the intended significance of the
192 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 1 (emphasis supplied).
193 See Teitz, supra note 1, at 552 (describing the difficult task of resolving
differences among legal systems as they pertain to specific substantive legal rules
and issues).
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word "matters" in Articles 2 and 21, the sensible approach would
permit the United States to make an Article 21 Declaration (if it
saw fit to do so) with respect to suitably defined mass-market cases
and thereby permit the Convention's intended reciprocity to
operate with respect to choice of court agreements that our
constituent courts are unlikely to enforce.
A mass-market definition is both harder and easier to construct
than an appropriate franchise definition. As noted earlier, "mass-
market contract" has not been defined in domestic legislation and
is a construct one derives from the class action waiver cases. The
silver lining is that it is unnecessary to conform a Declaration to
extant and varied domestic legislation. As before, what is
necessary is that a Declaration be broad enough to cover the
divergent cases.
As discussed earlier, the American Law Institute's project,
Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice-of-Law,
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes, has made the most
headway in creating a suitable definition of "mass-market
contract." Section 101(3) defines the concept as a contract that "(a)
is prepared by one party for repeated use; (b) is presented to
another party or parties (the 'nondrafting party') by the [first]
party . . ; and (c) does not afford the nondrafting party a
meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms." 194 This definition
is broad enough to cover any of the cases discussed earlier in this
rapidly developing area, and would leave to local law (most of
which is welcoming to choice of court agreements) the question
whether to enforce a choice of court agreement in the mass-market
setting.195 Creating such an Article 21 Declaration would mitigate
the problems identified here with the enforceability of choice of
194 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, supra note 115, at 9-10.
195 Were the United States to create a Declaration excluding mass-market
contracts from coverage under the Convention, the effect would be to leave to
diverse local law the question of enforceability. In that context, a court faced with
a choice of court agreement in an international mass-market context might well
look to the American Law Institute's INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES, supra note 115, as a modem expression of policy in a closely analogous
area. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying note 128, those principles
provide enough flexibility for local courts to enforce, or refuse to enforce, such
provisions. But they would vastly aid adjudication by providing a well thought
through set of criteria for coming to an appropriate resolution on enforceability.
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court agreements in the mass-market area and thereby improve the
prospects for the success of the Convention.
7. CONCLUSION
The Hague Choice of Court Convention brings the
international community closer than it has ever been to a reliable
system for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. But
as difficult as the Convention's negotiations and drafting may have
been, the harder work of convincing states to join the Convention
still lies ahead. The history of the project suggests that the United
States must take a lead in the ratification effort. We will be unable
to do so credibly unless we can convince other states that their
choice of court agreements will, under the Convention, receive
enforcement throughout the United States that is symmetrical to
that which will be given by other states considering the
Convention. Given the current state of United States law in the
areas of franchise and mass-market contracts, such a showing will
be difficult.
Of the available options, limiting the United States'
commitment by making an Article 21 Declaration seems the most
promising and, while it will further narrow the coverage of the
Convention, it will ease domestic compliance problems and also
yield a symmetry that may prove attractive to other states. Such an
approach may be the best chance we will have for a long time in
finally effecting an improvement to international recognition and
enforcement of judgments, a long recognized impediment to
smooth international trade.
8. APPENDIX: U.S. STATE FRANCHISE DEFINITIONS
CALIFORNIA: CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 31005 (2006)
(a) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either expressed
or implied, whether oral or written, between two or more persons
by which:
(1) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling or distributing goods or services under a
marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a
franchisor; and
(2) The operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such
plan or system is substantially associated with the franchisor's
trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising or
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other commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate;
and
(3) The franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a
franchise fee.
ILLINOIS: 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/3 (1999)
§ 3 Definitions. As used in this Act:
(1) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either expressed
or implied, whether oral or written, between two or more persons
by which:
(a) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services, under a
marketing plan or system prescribed or suggested in substantial
part by a franchisor; and
(b) the operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such
plan or system is substantially associated with the franchisor's
trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or
other commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate;
and
(c) the person granted the right to engage in such business is
required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee of $500 or
more ....
INDIANA: IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-1 (2005)
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter:
(a) "Franchise" means a contract by which:
(1) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
dispensing goods or services, under a marketing plan or system
prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor;
(2) the operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such a
plan is substantially associated with the franchisor's trademark,
service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other
commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate; and
(3) the person granted the right to engage in this business is
required to pay a franchise fee.
"Franchise" includes a contract whereby the franchisee is
granted the right to sell franchises on behalf of the franchisor.
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IOWA: IOWA CODE ANN. § 537A.10 (2007)
1. Definitions. When used in this section, unless the context
otherwise requires:...
c. (1) "Franchise" means either of the following:
(a) An oral or written agreement, either express or implied,
which provides all of the following:
(i) Grants the right to distribute goods or provide services
under a marketing plan prescribed or suggested in substantial part
by the franchisor.
(ii) Requires payment of a franchise fee to a franchisor or its
affiliate.
(iii) Allows the franchise business to be substantially
associated with a trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype,
advertisement, or other commercial symbol of or designating the
franchisor or its affiliate.
MARYLAND: MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. § 14-201 (2004)
(c) "Area franchise" means an agreement between a franchisor
and subfranchisor in which, for consideration, the subfranchisor is
granted the right to sell or negotiate the sale of franchises in the
name of or for the franchisor...
(e)(1) "Franchise" means an expressed or implied, oral or
written agreement in which:
(i) a purchaser is granted the right to engage in the business
of offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a
marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by the
franchisor;
(ii) the operation of the business under the marketing plan or
system is associated substantially with the trademark, service
mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other commercial
symbol that designates the franchisor or its affiliate; and
(iii) the purchaser must pay, directly or indirectly, a
franchise fee.
(2) "Franchise" includes an area franchise.
MICHIGAN: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1502 (2002)
(3) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either express
or implied, whether oral or written, between 2 or more persons to
which all of the following apply:
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(a) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a
marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a
franchisor.
(b) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services substantially
associated with the franchisor's trademark, service mark, trade
name, logotype, advertising, or other commercial symbol
designating the franchisor or its affiliate.
(c) The franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a
franchise fee.
MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. ANN. 80C.01 (1999)
Subd. 4. "Franchise" means (a) a contract or agreement, either
express or implied, whether oral or written, for a definite or
indefinite period, between two or more persons:
(1) by which a franchisee is granted the right to engage in
the business of offering or distributing goods or services using the
franchisor's trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype,
advertising, or other commercial symbol or related characteristics;
(2) in which the franchisor and franchisee have a community
of interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail,
by lease, agreement, or otherwise; and
(3) for which the franchisee pays, directly or indirectly, a
franchise fee; or
(b) a contract, lease, or other agreement, either express or
implied, whether oral or written, for a definite or indefinite period,
between two or more persons, whereby the franchisee is granted
the right to market motor vehicle fuel using the franchisor's trade
name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising, or other
commercial symbol or related characteristics for which the
franchise pays a franchise fee; or
(c) the sale or lease of any products, equipment, chattels,
supplies, or services to the purchaser, other than the sale of sales
demonstration equipment, materials or samples for a total price of
$500 or less to any one person, for the purpose of enabling the
purchaser to start a business and in which the seller:
(1) represents that the seller, lessor, or an affiliate thereof
will provide locations or assist the purchaser in finding locations
for the use or operation of vending machines, racks, display cases,
or similar devices, or currency operated amusement machines or
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devices, on premises neither owned or leased by the purchaser or
seller; or
(2) represents that the seller will purchase any or all
products made, produced, fabricated, grown, bred, or modified by
the purchaser using, in whole or in part, the supplies, services, or
chattels sold to the purchaser; or
(3) guarantees that the purchaser will derive income from
the business which exceeds the price paid to the seller; or
(d) an oral or written contract or agreement, either expressed or
implied, for a definite or indefinite period, between two or more
persons, under which a manufacturer, selling security systems
through dealers or distributors in this state, requires regular
payments from the distributor or dealer as royalties or residuals for
products purchased and paid for by the dealer or distributor.
NEW JERSEY: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-3 (2001)
As used in this act:
a. "Franchise" means a written arrangement for a definite or
indefinite period, in which a person grants to another person a
license to use a trade name, trade mark, service mark, or related
characteristics, and in which there is a community of interest in the
marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease,
agreement, or otherwise.
NORTH DAKOTA: N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-02 (1999)
Definitions. When used in this chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires:
2. "Area franchise" means any contract or agreement between a
franchisor and a subfranchisor whereby the subfranchisor is
granted the right, for consideration given in whole or in part for
such right, to sell or negotiate the sale of franchises in the name or
on behalf of the franchisor....
5. a. "Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either
expressed or implied, whether oral or written, between two or
more persons by which:
(1) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a
marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a
franchisor;
(2) The operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such
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plan or system is substantially associated with the franchisor's
trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or
other commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate;
and
(3) The franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a
franchise fee.
b. When used in this chapter, unless specifically stated
otherwise, "franchise" includes "area franchise".
RHODE ISLAND: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-3 (1998)
Definitions...
(7) "Franchise" means
(i) An oral or written agreement, either express or implied,
which:
(A) Grants the right to distribute goods or provide services
under a marketing plan prescribed or suggested in substantial part
by the franchisor;
(B) Requires payment of a franchise fee in excess of five
hundred dollars ($500) to a franchisor or its affiliate; and
(C) Allows the franchise business to be substantially associated
with a trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising,
or other commercial symbol of or designating the franchisor or its
affiliate; or
(ii) A master franchise.
WASHINGTON: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.010 (1999)
Definitions...
(4) "Franchise" means:
(a) An agreement, express or implied, oral or written, by which:
(i) A person is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a
marketing plan prescribed or suggested in substantial part by the
grantor or its affiliate;
(ii) The operation of the business is substantially associated
with a trademark, service mark, trade name, advertising, or other
commercial symbol designating, owned by, or licensed by the
grantor or its affiliate; and
(iii) The person pays, agrees to pay, or is required to pay,
directly or indirectly, a franchise fee.
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